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AN INVESTIGATION OF DEATH QUALIFICATION
AS A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF JURORS
ADAM M. CLARK
Remorse for Any Death
Free of memory and hope,
unlimited, abstract, almost future,
the dead body is not somebody: It is death.
Like the God of the mystics,
whom they insist has no attributes,
the dead person is no one everywhere,
is nothing but the loss and absence of the world.
We rob it of everything,
we do not leave it one color, one syllable:
Here is the yard which its eyes no longer take up,
there is the sidewalk where it waylaid its hope.
It might even be thinking
what we are thinking.
We have divided among us, like thieves,
the treasure of nights and days.
- Jorge Luis Borges
I. INTRODUCTION

"I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy,
and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty." 2 These are the
words of Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Furman v. Georgia, and
voting to uphold the death penalty. He goes on to say:
That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital
punishment serves no useful purpose that can be
demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's
training and life's experiences, and is not
1 JORGE LuIS BORGES, Remorsefor Any Death, reprinted in SELECTED POEMS
21 (Willis Barnstone et al trans., Alexander Coleman ed., Penguin Books 1999).
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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compatible with the philosophical convictions I
have been able to develop. It3 is antagonistic to any
sense of "reverence for life."
The varied opinions of justices of the Supreme Court
provide a graphic illustration of the divisiveness of the death
penalty issue. They range from those who vote to abolish the death
penalty, to those like Blackmun, who are opposed to the practice,
but think it is not the Court's job to overrule it. On the other
extreme, one Justice reportedly encouraged the Supreme Court to
hold that racially discriminatory executions were not a
constitutional problem,4 simply so that states could "get on
promptly with the business of killing." 5
This paper focuses on the use of the "death-qualified" jury.
Death-qualified juries allow the exclusion from jury service of
anyone who would refuse to sentence a defendant to death in a
capital case. However, as the' Supreme Court stated in one case,
"It]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire
community." 6 Our nation's legal and judicial system can be seen as
"uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." 7 The United
States has been treading water in an effort to retain the death
nations, and many
penalty, 8 while most of the world's developed
9
it.
abolished
have
nations,
developing
' Id. at 405-06.
4 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
5 Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Law is Left Twisting Slowly in the Wind, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at M5. See also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 661-62
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing previous Court decisions which
allowed too much juror discretion in hearing mitigating factors and deciding
against death).
6 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87
(1986).
7 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1968) ("[Tjhe State crossed the
line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty,
the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.").
8 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
9 See infra Part IV, International Law Documents; infra Part V, The Current
State of the Death Penalty Within and Beyond the United States. See also, e.g.,
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This paper argues that the process of death-qualifying a jury is a
serious violation of the rights of potential jurors. This is a step
beyond the usual argument that the process violates defendants'
rights.' 0 The excluded jurors are prevented from serving on a jury
which, arguably, is as important as the right to vote,"1 because of a
belief that is reasonably held in light of a wide range of both
international and domestic opinions. The Supreme Court has
spoken of those who would not return a death sentence as being
"unable to follow the law."' 12 The Court has also said that the issue
of the death penalty should be left up to majority processes such
as
13
legislation, referendums, and decisions by elected executives.
While this paper looks at issues and cases from international law,
the goal of this paper is not to make an international legal
argument against the death penalty or death-qualified juries. In the
first place, although the death penalty is strongly opposed in much
international law, the American system of jury sentencing is not
Craig S. Smith, Threats and Responses: Two Worldviews; Joking Aside, a
Serious Antipathy To Things American Rises in Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14
2003, at A13 ("The death penalty, for example, has been overwhelmingly
rejected by the majority of Europeans as a barbaric throwback to less civilized
times. Its abolition is required for membership in the European Union."); Turkey
Agrees
Death Penalty Ban,
BBC
News
UK
Edition,
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1ihi/world/europe/3384667.stm (Jan. 9, 2004) (explaining
that Turkey signed Protocol 13 to the European Convention, which abolishes the
death penalty during times of war and peace, and that Turkey's parliament voted
to abolish the death penalty in 2002).
10It has frequently been argued that death qualification violates the rights of the
accused facing trial, but the Supreme Court has rejected these claims. See, e.g.,
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 176 (1986).
" See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as PoliticalParticipationAkin to
Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203 (1995).

Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 184.
e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("If we were possessed of legislative power I would either join with
[Justices voting for the abolition of the death penalty] or, at the very least,
restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous
crimes.").
12

13 See,
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required by international law, and is seen in the same form only in
common law nations. While abolishing death qualification could
end or significantly reduce actual death sentences, anything short
of completely outlawing the death penalty probably would not
satisfy the international principles that are important here. This
paper argues against a specific use of the jury system, rather than
arguing for the complete abolition of the death penalty or a more
complete implementation of international law. Secondly, even if
the death-qualified jury could be demonstrated to be illegal under
international law, this would not have any direct effect on the law
of the United States. The United States has a dualist legal system,
meaning that any international law must be enacted as a law within
this country before it can give rights to U.S. citizens. The United
States has also shown extreme unwillingness to accept
international legal arguments in regard to issues like the death
penalty. One writer noted that "[w]ith respect to international
developments, the United States seems to have a studied
indifference, possibly the consequence of its long isolationist
associated
traditions, but more likely attributable to the arrogance
4
superpower."'
remaining
last
the
as
status
its
with
Part II of this paper gives a background and explanation of
death qualification. It also explains Witherspoon v. Illinois,15 the
foundational case for modern death qualification. Part III gives a
further background of some other important Supreme Court death
penalty cases. It details some of the patterns of death penalty law
in the United States over the last thirty years.
Part IV explains some of the international law documents
that seem, at least facially, to argue against the death penalty. This
part also details some regional treaties that have completely or
almost completely abolished the death penalty. Part V details some
international and domestic law cases and opinions that have
rejected the death penalty. This part also gives some details and
statistics about the death penalty, both in the United States and
14 William

A. Schabas, International Law and the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY, 178, 210 (Stephen P.
Garvey ed., 2003).
15391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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around the world. This is intended not as a legal argument, but
rather to underscore just how reasonable it is to be 'unable' to
sentence anyone to death. As reasonable persons who are arguably
within the worldwide majority view, death penalty opponents
should not be kept out of juries.
Part VI explains Lockhart v. McCree,16 a case in which the
Supreme Court stated that death qualification does not interfere
with the substantial rights of jurors. It demonstrates that these
statements do not necessarily preclude further argument on the
issue. It also clarifies some reasons why death qualification
interferes with jurors' important political rights. The Court in
Lockhart equates a juror's ability to apply the death penalty with
following the "rule of law."' 7 Part VII examines the idea that the
death penalty may not fit within the rule of law in the United States
as established in some of the Supreme Court's opinions.
Part VIII explains that the retention of the death penalty
may be causing economic and developmental harm to the United
States. In fact the jurors who are excluded tend to be lower on the
economic scale, and so are arguably harmed the most by these
policy choices. Part IX explains that the right to life, and the right
to protect life, is far too important to be left entirely to the
majority. In regards to the death penalty, the rights of the minority
should be protected from the tyranny of the majority. Although at
18
the nation's founding the death penalty was clearly allowable,
protection of certain rights against the will 19of the majority is also
central and foundational to the Constitution.
16 476 U.S. 162.
'7Id. at 176.
18See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to

answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury. .").
19E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison).
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Part X argues that the process of death qualifying juries is a
substantial violation of rights because it forces jurors and potential
jurors to bear a certain amount of complicity in the application of
death.2 ° Jurors with strong beliefs about the death penalty must
face a difficult choice between turning their backs and lying to say
they could apply the death penalty. Jurors who are honest about
their beliefs will be rejected from service and the opportunity to
defend life, and this applies a certain amount of guilt for being
honest. Those who lie about their beliefs can get into the jury, and
add their beliefs to the debate, but the lying juror is exactly the
juror that society should seek to avoid.
Part XI suggests some alternative solutions for death
qualification. It argues that the best solution would be to end the
process of excluding death-opposed jurors. Part XII concludes the
paper and demonstrates that it can be considered within the
Supreme Court's powers to end death qualification. The end of
death qualification would not necessarily mean the end of the death
penalty, and it would also not interfere with the public good.
II. DEATH QUALIFICATION BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

When a jury is formed there are two separate processes by
which jurors are weeded out. During the first stage the judge or
attorneys question potential jurors, and the juror may be excluded

20 "[T]he Eighth Amendment requires individual jurors to make, and take

responsibilityfor, a decision to sentence a person to death." Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 619 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis

added).
It is this idea of complicity that led me to write this paper. As
citizens of a free country, I believe that we all bear some
responsibility for our nation's human rights violations, but
those who are opposed to the death penalty seem to be always
in the minority. Due to minority status and the lack of the
death penalty as an issue in most elections, there are not many
valid political opportunities for death opposition. I believe that
finding legal arguments against the death penalty is the best
way for me to respond to my own inherent complicity.
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for cause. 2 1 These challenges are based on the juror's inability to
serve in the case based, for example, on personal association with
one of the parties, or some form of prejudice. 22 These challenges
are not limited in number. The second stage involves peremptory
challenges, 23 where attorneys for each side can challenge jurors for
no particular reason, although not in an intentionally
discriminatory way. 24 Peremptory challenges are limited in
number, 25 so a prosecutor may not want to waste these challenges
on those who are opposed to the death penalty, but would give a
fair reading on guilt.
Death qualification allows persons who "would not
consider" the death penalty to be excluded at the for cause stage.26
Such persons are held to be unable to serve in a death penalty case.
Death qualification is usually encoded in state common law or
statutes. The opposite process also takes place; "life-qualification"
allows for cause exclusion of anyone who would automatically
27
vote for the death penalty without considering mitigating factors.
Criminal juries are not selected in this way in any situation other
21

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (7' ed. 1999) ("A party's challenge

supported by a specified reason, such as bias or prejudice, that would disqualify
that potential juror.").
22 See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501-02(1972) (Examples of for cause
exclusion are issues that may cause bias against the defendant, including juror
insanity, the threat of mob violence against the jury, and a juror who already has
a fixed opinion about the case. Issues which lend the appearance of bias also can
lead to exclusion; for example, a judge or juror who would have a personal or
monetary interest in the outcome of the case.).
h
23 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (7" ed. 1999).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000)
("Under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant may not exercise a peremptory
challenge to remove a potential juror solely on the basis of the juror's gender,
ethnic origin, or race." (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (ethnic origin);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race)).
25 See supra note 23.
26 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 515 n.9 (1968).
27 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
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than death penalty cases.28
The primary purpose for death qualification of juries is to
avoid jury nullification. Nullification occurs when a juror applies
her beliefs about the death penalty to the guilt phase of the trial. In
order to avoid the death penalty, the defendant is found not guilty
in spite of the weight of the evidence. 29 A secondary purpose for
death qualification is to insure that the death penalty can be
applied, even if a large number of people in a given community are
opposed to it.
It has been argued, and even assumed by the Supreme
Court, that the death-qualified jury is more prone to convict a
criminal than a non-death-qualified jury.30 It has also been argued
that this is a violation of the defendant's right to an "impartial"
jury taken from a "fair cross section" of the community. 31 The
Supreme Court, however, has held that death-qualified
juries do
32
requirement.
cross-section
fair
the
not violate
Witherspoon v. Illinois,33 decided in 1968, is the modem
Supreme Court's first significant death penalty case. 34 The Court
35
gave a strong holding against use of death-qualified juries.
Witherspoon is based on a challenge to an Illinois statutory scheme
which gave juries full discretion to decide whether to impose a
death sentence, and excluded from jury service anyone who "on
being examined state[s] that he has conscientious scruples against
28 Stephen Gillers, Provingthe Prejudiceof Death-QualifiedJuries after Adams

v. Texas, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 219, 224 (1985).
29

Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understandingthe Language of Death

Qualification,54 BAYLOR L. REv. 677, 679 (2002).
30 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177 (1986)
(holding "that 'death
qualification' does not violate the fair-cross-section requirement.").
"' Id. at 184 ("[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community is impartial .. .
121d. at 177.
" 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
34 WELSH S. WHITE, Witherspoon Revisited: Exploring the Tension between
Witherspoon and Furman, in LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
INCAPITAL CASES 33, 33. (1984).
35 Chief Justice Burger referred to Witherspoon as "the elimination of deathqualified juries." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 398 (1972).
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capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."3 6 The
holding in Witherspoon created two allowable exclusions: (1) those
who would "automatically" vote against the death penalty, and (2)
"nullifiers" who would allow their feelings about the death penalty
37
to interfere with their decision about the defendant's guilt.
Many arguments against the death penalty are focused on
circumstantial factors, such as unfair application by race or
socioeconomic status, or the execution of innocent persons. The
death qualification process under Witherspoon requires only that a
juror be willing to consider all the evidence in a case, including all
mitigating and aggravating factors, and make a choice between life
imprisonment and death. A specific choice of life or death is not
mandated, merely the consideration, and the acceptance of that
duty to consider.
The death qualification process essentially boils the death
penalty debate down to its purest form; the question is not whether
the death penalty actually deters, whether it is the best form of
retribution, or whether it is unfairly applied, but simply whether it
should ever be used. To be excluded from a death-qualified jury, a
juror must state that she would not consider even an obviously
'fair' use of the death penalty against a defendant who is obviously
guilty. The person excluded from a death-qualified jury is a person
who believes that no human 38being should be put to death, no
matter what he or she has done.
The question to be answered is whether the belief that
human life should never be violated by the State is in itself
reasonable. It is at this point that evidence related to unfair
36

Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 743 (1959)).

37 WHITE, supra note 34, at 34.
38

See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 n.6 (giving an example of

voir dire questioning of an excludable juror where the trial judge asked: "You
yourself are in such a frame of mind that regardless of how horrible the facts and
circumstances are, that you would automatically vote against the imposition of
the death penalty?" (quoting O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 379 (51, Cir.
1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984)).
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application of, and international views about, the death penalty
once again become factors. The failings of the death penalty do not
prove that the death penalty should be abolished; rather, they prove
that it is reasonable to believe that this punishment is one of
society's evils. It can then be argued that a juror should not be
restricted from jury duty because of this reasonably held belief.
It is important to note that the death penalty is substantially
different from other 'moral' restrictions on jury service. In his
dissent in Witherspoon, Justice Black cites to Logan v. United
States, an 1892 case allowing the exclusion of jurors with scruples
against the death penalty. 39 In Logan, the Court stated that a juror
who has scruples against the death penalty is not impartial,4 °
comparing death penalty opposition to support for polygamy:
"This court has accordingly held that a person who has a
conscientious belief that polygamy is rightful may be challenged
for cause on a trial for polygamy. ' 41 This comparison points to an
important difference between the death penalty and other moral
scruple issues (such as abortion, polygamy, homosexuality,
religion, etc.). In all of these other moral issues, the defendant
stands accused of something relating to the rejected jurors' moral
standards. In the case of polygamy, the person who believes that
polygamy should be allowable does not think the polygamistdefendant committed a crime at all. In the case of the death
penalty, the abolitionist agrees that murder is a crime 42 that should
be punished or deterred, and that society should be protected from
the murderer. A more accurate comparison to the polygamyexcludable juror would be a person who felt that murder was not
wrong. A more accurate comparison to certain abortion belief
exclusions would be a juror who believes that it is right to break
39

See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 536-37 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Logan v.

United
States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892)).
40
Logan, 144 U.S. at 298.
41 Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 147, 157 (1878); Miles
v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304, 310 (1880)).
42 Arguably, the abolitionist values human life more than those who
would
consider the death penalty; they think that not even a horrible murderer should
be deprived of life.
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the law in order to stop an execution, in a case where the defendant
is in fact accused of breaking the law to prevent an execution.
Exclusion because of death penalty beliefs is akin to exclusion
based on a certain theory of punishment, such as excluding those
who have retributive views, or excluding utilitarians.
The very process of death qualification may make the jury
more likely to convict or vote for death.43 A famous psychological
study by Stanley Milgram shows one way in which the process of
death qualification could prejudice jurors to favor conviction or
death sentences. 4 In this study, volunteer "teachers" were asked to
"teach" volunteer "students" by administering electric shocks
every time the student answered a question incorrectly. 45 The
doctors in charge of the experiment would tell any "teacher" who
expressed doubts that "the experiment says you must go on." 46 In
this way, they were able to coerce the "teachers" into giving
increasingly painful shocks long past the point where the
"students" begged for the shocks to stop. 47 Clearly if volunteers are
willing to follow the rather ambivalent orders of doctors in an
experiment, those who are told by a judge that the rule of law
requires them to consider the death penalty are likely to be affected
in some way. This amounts to coercing those who have scruples
against the death penalty to participate in it, and excluding those
who hold firmly to their scruples. Added to this is the fact that
43 Lockhart

v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 169-70, 170 n.6 (1986) (citing Craig
Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the DeathQualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984)). See also Rozelle,
supra note 29, at 694 (Haney's study shows that jurors who sit through the
death-qualification questions are more likely to feel "(1) that the judge, defense
counsel, and prosecutor all believe that the defendant is guilty, and (2) that the
defendant is in fact guilty.").
44 Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305, 391-93
(citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974)).
45 Id. The students were in fact actors, who only pretended to be shocked, but the
teacher volunteers were unaware of this.
46

Id.

47 Id.
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Milgram's volunteers were sympathetic innocent students, while a
person before a death penalty jury is likely to be (in perception at
least, all presumption of innocence aside), the least sympathetic
person that the average juror will ever come across. It would
actually be rather surprising if the judge's pre-trial questions and
comments had no effect on the jurors.
This could in turn be argued to mean that excludable jurors
are better jurors because they are the most consistent in their
beliefs. They would rather suffer painful personal rejection by an
authority figure than do what they truly believe to be wrong. It
may tend to be the least nervous, and most consistent and rational
types of jurors who could admit that they are 'unable to follow the
law.' More unsteady types, or those who have never given any
thought to the issue, will .likely make an effort to please the
questioning judge by quickly claiming that they can apply the
death penalty.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECENT DEATH PENALTY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

After Witherspoon, the next major death penalty jury case
was McGautha v. California.48 The Supreme Court held that it was
not a violation of the Constitution to leave the choice of death
sentence completely up to jury discretion. 49 The Court further held
that a single jury could50 be used for both the sentencing and the
guilt decision in a case.
In 1972, the Court decided the important Furman51 case,
which basically brought an end to the way states had been applying
the death penalty. 52 Furman was based on the Eighth Amendment
48402 U.S. 183 (1971).
49 Id. at 207-08 ("In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution").
5
0 Id. at 209-210.
51 Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
52 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 659 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining the holding in Furman and
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right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 53 Two justices
wrote opinions stating that the death penalty was always a cruel
and unusual punishment, but ultimately the case would be applied
to mean simply that death 54was cruel and unusual in the way that
states had been applying it.
Following Furman, states had to rewrite their laws in order
to continue to use the death penalty, and they came up with two
different basic methods. The first was mandatory death sentencing,
meaning that if a jury found guilt for certain offenses, the
defendant would automatically be sentenced to death. Mandatory
death sentences were held to be unconstitutional in 1976 in
Woodson v. North Carolina.55 The second way that states found to
apply the death penalty within the boundaries of Furman was by
giving juries guided discretion in choosing the death penalty. The
death penalty was applied at the full discretion of juries in most
death penalty states before 1972.56 Discretion was given to juries
because the problem of jury nullification was widespread with
mandatory death penalty laws. If the jurors thought that a
defendant should not be executed, they would acquit if they didn't
have flexibility to give a lighter sentence. 57 Furman seemed to
overrule the idea of complete jury discretion, because full
discretion meant that the death penalty was applied in too arbitrary
and capricious a manner, so the idea of guided discretion was
advanced. 58 Under guided discretion, the jury decides the sentence,
its subsequent legal applications), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002).
13 Walton, 497 U.S. at
657-58.
54
1d at 659.
" 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
56 WHITE, supra note 34, at 1-2.
57 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1972) (citing McGautha
v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1971)).
5' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) ("[D]iscretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.").
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but is required to consider certain aggravating and mitigating
factors. 59 In Gregg v. Georgia, again
in 1976, guided juror
6°
discretion was found to be allowable.
Gregg brought an end to a de facto moratorium on the
death penalty that had existed since the late 1960s, while the court
was busy deciding Witherspoon, McGautha and Furman.6 1 Gregg
also essentially reinstated the death penalty after many thought that
Furman had abolished it, and as a result modern death penalty
statistics generally refer to this 1976 reinstatement.
In 1986, the Court decided Lockhart v. McCree,6 2 which
upheld death qualification. The challenge this time was based on
whether death qualification was unconstitutional because it led to
more "conviction prone" juries. 63 The court assumed that deathqualified juries were more prone to convict, 64 but held that
the
65
exclusion process still did not violate the defendant's rights.
Lockhart clarified that the category of excludable jurors
had broadened somewhat since Witherspoon.66 The original
standard set by Witherspoon had been changed by two cases,
Adams v. Texas 67 and Wainwright v. Witt,6 8 into a single prong
question of "substantial impairment" of the juror's ability to apply
the law. 69 Rather than basing exclusion on nullification or
automatic votes, the new question was whether a juror was able to
follow the law if it called for the death penalty. 70 Under this
adjusted standard, the court held that jurors who would not vote for
'9 Walton, 497 U.S. at 659.
60 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
61 See Furman,408 U.S. at 434 n. 18.
62 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
63

Id.

64Id. at

173.

Id. at 177.
66
See id. at 167 n. 1.
67 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
68 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
69
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167 n. I (citing Adams, 448 U.S. at 45; Witt, 476 U.S. at
65

433 ("[T]he proper constitutional standard is simply whether a prospective

juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ")).
70
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167 n.1.
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71
the death penalty were excludable as "unable to follow the law."
In 2002, the Court decided in Ring v. Arizona that trial
72
judges could not find any facts that were not found by the jury.
Arizona law provided that if a jury returned a first-degree murder
conviction, the trial judge would decide whether certain
aggravating factors existed.73 Based on these factors the judge
would decide between a sentence of death and life in prison. The
holding in Ring means that although judges can be given discretion
to decide a sentence, this discretion is bound within a very narrow
range. A judge cannot decide any aggravating element that would
lead to a punishment more severe than that provided for by the
jury. 75 Ring essentially confirms juror discretion in death penalty
cases, as well as further
weakening statutory attempts at quasi76
sentences.
mandatory
Also in 2002, the Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that
executions of mentally retarded persons were no longer
allowable. 77 The decision was based on "evolving standards of
decency"unde
as to whether
the78the punishment was cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment. This decision effectively overruled
previously existing common law and statutes that had upheld the
death penalty for the mentally retarded.79
In 2005, the Court abolished the execution of persons who
committed capital crimes before they reached the age of eighteen
in Roper v. Simmons. This opinion was notable for its references

"
72

Id.at 176.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002).

73 Id.
74id.

71Id. at
76

588-89.
Ring also overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had

upheld the Arizona sentencing scheme. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id.at 321.
79
Id. at 313-14.
'

78
80

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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to international opinions and documents, not as binding, but as
"instructive." 8 1 On the other hand, perhaps just as important is the
criticism, beginning with Justice Scalia's dissent, that the Court
82
has received for its consideration of the opinions of other nations.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS

Many International legal opinions and national laws have
moved against the death penalty in recent years. The United States
is the only nation of the top twenty executing nations which is
considered to have an "above-average record in human rights
matters." 83 Most of Western Europe has abolished the death
penalty, but the European abolitionist attitude has also developed
relatively recently. 84 The first post-Furmanexecution in the United
States took place in 1977, and in the same year France executed
81

See id. at 1198:

Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our
responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court's
decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other
countries and to international authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth Aiendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments."
Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
82 See id. at 1198 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's
moral standards--and in the course of discharging that
awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the
views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not
believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more
than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution,
should be determined by the subjective views of five Members
of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.
83 Franklin E. Zimring, Postscript: The PeculiarPresent of American
Capital
REPAIR?,
supra
note
14,
at
212,
216.
Punishment,in BEYOND
84

Id. at 213.
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two people by guillotine. 85 These beheadings took place in a nation
where only 27 percent of the citizenry opposed the death penalty
(including the French President). 86 Sixty-one percent favored
continued use of the guillotine.8 7 However, these executions were
the last to occur in Western Europe.8 8 The fall of European
Communism in the early 1990s also led to significant death penalty
abolitions, including in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Romania.89 In 2001, Canada's Supreme Court held that
in the
extraditing a criminal who would face the death penalty
90
Constitution.
Canadian
the
United States would violate
Along with a groundswell of opinions and legal precedents
against the death penalty within other nations, 9 1 there are also
significant written treaties that argue against the death penalty. The
international law of individual human rights is based on three
major documents. 92 The first is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR).93 The original charter of the United
Nations did not contain a bill of rights, and so in 1949 the UDHR
was adopted to work toward this goal.94 The UDHR is a
declaration, so it is not legally binding on signatory nations. 95 In
its preamble, the UDHR recognizes "the inherent dignity and...
85 Id.

86
87

88

Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214.

d.
89 Id. at 215. Romania executed its former leader and abolished the death

penalty within a one month period. Id.
Schabas, supra note 14, at 187.
91See generally infra Part V.

90

92 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 138-39 (2d ed. 2000).

93 Id.; see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.

GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter UDHR).
94 Eleanor Roosevelt was instrumental in the drafting of the UDHR. STEINER &
ALSTON supra note 92, at 138-39.
95 On the other hand, it could be considered as evidence of practice that would
lead toward the adoption of law as custom.
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the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family ... ."96 Article 3 states: "Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of person." 97 While these statements would
seem to clearly refer to the death penalty, they in fact do not. Many
of the signatory nations other than the United States still applied
the death penalty at the time of the drafting of the UDHR. The
death penalty was used as a98punishment in the Nuremberg Trials
just a few short years before.
The desired bill of rights was not achieved until 1976, and
then it came in the form of two separate documents, a split which
was largely caused by Cold War antagonism between the East and
West. The West, led by the United States, favored civil and
political rights as dominant, and adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1976. 99 The
East, favoring economic and social rights, was more supportive of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), l°° which was also put into action in 1976.
President Carter signed the ICESCR, but the Senate has not ratified
it. 1 1 As the Covenant to which the United States is a party, the
ICCPR will be focused on here, but the refusal to put the ICESCR
into force demonstrates
important ideas about the United States'
10 2
ideals.
economic
Article 6 of the ICCPR states: "Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."' 10 3 This is immediately
96

UDHR, supra note 93, at pmbl. para. 1.

97 UDHR, supra note 93, at art. 3.
98 See STEINER & ALSTON supra note 92, at
33.
99 Id see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (hereinafter ICCPR).
100 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (entered into force 1976) (hereinafter ICESCR).
101 See STEINER & ALSTON supranote 92, at 250.
102 For a further discussion of economic issues, see infra Part VIII, Economics
and Development.
103 ICCPR, supra note 99, at art. 6(l).
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followed, however, by an exception which allows the death
sentence to be applied by "countries which have not abolished the
death penalty . . . for the most serious crimes.
...104 This
exception shows the inherent weakness of any international law
document which is made at the free will of the parties. In order to
get parties to sign and adhere to the law, certain exceptions must
be allowed. Although the ICCPR would have more integrity as a
document without this exception, it also would lack the world's
one remaining 'superpower' as a signatory. It is important also to
note that there are exceptions to the exception, which the United
States did not meet until recently. Specifically Article 6(5) states:
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age. .... 105 The United States
until they were
continued to carry out these "juvenile executions"
10 6
abolished in 2005 by Roper v. Simmons.
Article 7 of the ICCPR states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."' 107 Taken along with the exception allowing death,
this could be taken to mean that the method of execution should
not be "cruel, inhuman or degrading."'' 0 8 Another way to look at
this article is to consider the death penalty as a form of mental
104
5

Id. at art. 6(2).

106

See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.

107

Id. at art. 7.

'o Id. at

art. 6(5).

'08 As an interesting side note, the electric chair, which is not considered to be
cruel and unusual in the United States, was not invented as a 'kind' form of
execution. Rather it was invented as a part of market competition in the early
days of electric utilities. Specifically Thomas Edison wanted to prove that
alternating current electricity (favored by his competitors in Westinghouse) was
more dangerous to humans than direct current, which he was attempting to sell.
Edison thought that if executions were carried out with alternating current,
people would see it as dangerous, and not want it in their homes. Pursuant to
this, Edison designed and created the first electric chair. See generally Dawn
Macready, The "Shocking" Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analysis of the
Unconstitutionalityof Electrocution,26 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 781 (2000).
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torture. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in 1993 overturned four
death sentences where the delays between sentencing and actual
execution were seen as "prolonged" and "dehumanizing."'' 9 While
the delays in the Zimbabwe case were as long as 72 months, death
row stays in the United States are often significantly longer than
this." 0 It should be noted that there is a certain danger to making
length-of-stay arguments, in that these arguments tend to
legitimize less procedurally adequate death sentences. The pace of
executions in the United States has sped up since the Effective
Death Penalty Act"' was enacted in 1996, but this Act is not
usually considered to be protective of the rights of prisoners.
In 1989, the U.N. adopted the Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR, 12 which abolishes the death penalty, allowing only a
limited exception during time of war. The Second Optional
Protocol refers back to Article 3 of the UDHR and Article 6 of the
ICCPR. Article 1 of the protocol states "[n]o one within the
jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be
executed."" 3 The Second Optional Protocol currently has 57 Party
Nations, 1 4 but the United States has not signed the Protocol.
109

See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney

General, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Judgment No. S.C. 73/93, 14 Hum. Rts.
L.J. 323 [1993], reprintedin part in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 92, at 19.
110 For example average death row stays in Texas are 10.43 years. See Texas
Department
of
Criminal
Justice,
Death
Row
Facts,
at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/drowfacts.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2003).
111 AEDPA, supra note 8.
112 Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming At the Abolition
of the
Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44 th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 206,
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (hereinafter Second Optional Protocol).
113 Second Optional Protocol, supra note 112 at art. I.
114 The current signatories are Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, BosniaHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama,
Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, TimorLeste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
Amnesty
International,
Ratification
of
International Treaties,
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Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
and the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
both abolished the death penalty in terms similar to the Second
Optional Protocol." 5 In 2002, the ECHR adopted the Protocol 13,
which removed the wartime exception; parties cannot execute
under any circumstances. 116 It seems clear that the United States is
outside the common practice of civilized nations in continuing to
apply the death penalty.
International treaties may also provide some protection of
the rights of jurors. Article 14 of the ICCPR deals with courts and7
tribunals, but it does not require nations to give jury trials."
Article 25 of the ICCPR is an example of a possible protection
against jury service exclusion, stating:
Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a)
To take part in the conduct of public
affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives...
(c)
To have access, on general terms 8of
equality, to public service in his country."
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-treaties-eng (last updated Mar. 21,
2006). It is interesting to note that many nations that the United States has
criticized for human rights violations in the past are on this list.
115 id.

116

id.

ICCPR, supra note 99, at art. 14(1) ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal .... );
see also Id.at art. 3. Article 14(1) does say that "[aIll persons shall be equal
before the courts and tribunals," and the well-known inequities in death penalty
application, as well as the inequities in juror exclusion, could be considered
unequal treatment before the courts. See also infra Part VIII, Economics and
Development.
118 ICCPR, supra note 99, at art. 25.
"7
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Article 2 in turn states that rights should be respected and ensured
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." (emphasis added)." 9
Although death qualification does seem to discriminate by race,
sex, and social class,' these distinctions are facially neutral.
Discrimination by political or other opinion on the other hand is
the express goal of any death qualification policy. The death
penalty may clearly be seen as a political issue, and so those who
are opposed to it should be allowed to "take part in the conduct of
public affairs" through jury service.
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
WITHIN AND BEYOND THE UNITED STATES

At the outset of this section, I would like to make it clear
that the purpose of giving numbers, facts, and international
opinions is not to make an international (or intranational) legal
argument against the death penalty. I leave this idea to other
writers and other papers.' 2' My purpose here is to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the abolitionist viewpoint. Potential jurors who
would refuse to apply the death penalty are backed up in their
beliefs by a wide variety of facts and legal opinions from around
the world. In the face of this, it cannot easily be said that an
abolitionist juror is incompetent to serve. Rather, it is clear that
these jurors have given more thought to issues of law and fact than
have many who would vote to apply the death penalty.
Currently 122 countries have abolished the death penalty in

Id. at art. 2.
120 See generally infra Part
121

VIII, Economics and Development.
See, e.g., Michelle McKee, Tinkering With the Machinery of Death:

Understanding Why the United State's Use of the Death Penalty Violates
Customary InternationalLaw, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 153 (2000).
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23

law or practice.
(This includes 25 countries that have laws
allowing the death penalty, but have not carried it out for more
than 10 years). 123 Seventy-four countries retain and use the death
penalty, but not all of these carry out executions every year. In
2004, 3,797 documented executions took place in 25 different
countries, with 97 percent of these taking place in China (3,400
known), Iran (159), and the United States (59). 124
Although international treaties, including the ICCPR,
forbid the execution of prisoners who were under the age 1of
25
eighteen at the time of their crime, these executions continue.
Prior to abolishing the juvenile death penalty, the United States
carried out the highest documented number of these executions (19
since 1990). 126
As of April 8, the United States had executed 12 people in
2006, bringing the total number of executions since 1976 to
1,016.127 The United States executed 60 prisoners in 2005.128 At
the end of 2005, over 3,300 inmates were on death row in the
United States. 129 Thirteen U.S. jurisdictions have abolished the

122 Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ deathpenalty-facts-eng (last updated Apr. 25,
2006).
123Id.
124 id

125 Eight

countries have carried out documented juvenile executions since 1990:

China, Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United States and Yemen.
Id. Of four documented "juvenile executions" in 2002 and 2003, three took
place in Texas, and one in Oklahoma, but these executions have now been
outlawed in the U.S. See supranotes 80-82 and accompanying text.
126 Facts and Figureson the Death Penalty, supra note 122.
127
Death
Penalty Information
Center, Execution Database, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php (last visited May 12, 2004).
28
1
129

id.

Death Penalty Information Center, Size of Death Row by Year (1968-

present),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did= 188#year
(last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
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death penalty, 30 while the thirteen top executing states have
carried out almost 90 percent of all U.S. executions.'
Texas alone
32
is responsible for 35 percent of the total. 1
The United States' tenacious grip on the death penalty has
placed it in the same category as nations it otherwise criticizes. If
the United States did not allow the death penalty, it would be.
easier and less hypocritical for it to criticize other nations' human
rights abuses. The United States has continually criticized the state
of human rights in China, but China officially outlawed use of the
juvenile death penalty before the United States. This in turn
allowed China to turn the tables, and criticize human rights in the
United States. 133 When Nigeria executed environmentalist Ken
Saro Wiwa, along with eight others, on falsified murder charges,
many in the United States were outraged. 34 However, since the
130

Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North

Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia have abolished the death penalty. Amnesty International USA,
Facts and Figures:
Executions in
the
USA
by
State,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/listbystate.doc (last updated Mar. 23, 2006).
Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and South Dakota (as well as
the U.S. Military) have laws allowing the death penalty, but have had no
executions since 1976. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State
Information,http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
131 Texas (362 executions), Virginia (94), Oklahoma (79), Missouri (66), Florida
(60), North Carolina (41), Georgia (39), South Carolina (35), Alabama (34),
Louisiana (27), Arkansas (27), Arizona (22), Ohio, 20. The total for these 13 is
906, which equals 89.173% of the national total of 1016. (Calculations based on
figures found at Amnesty International, Facts and Figures: Executions in the
USA
by State, supra note 130).
132
id.

133

Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, Figures
and Facts from the Human Rights Record of the United States in 2002,
http://www.china-un.ch/eng/rqrd/jzzdh/t85080.htm (Mar. 4, 2003) ("The United
States is one of the few countries to impose capital punishment on child
offenders and mentally ill people in the world. Two thirds of the executions of
child offenders over the past decade worldwide were carried out in the United
States.").
134 See Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Is Seeking Further Ways to Punish Nigeriafor
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, § 1, at 11.
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United States has almost certainly executed at least
some
35
others.'
criticize
to
room
much
without
left
is
innocents, it
There are also many nations that have abolished the death
penalty, and criticize the United States as the only developed
democracy to retain it.136 The European Union (EU) has abolished
the death penalty within its borders, and abolition is a requirement
for new joining members.' 37 The EU has expressed concern about
the death penalty in the United States.' 38 In 1999, at the United
Nations annual meeting on global democratic rights, United States
allies like Germany, Italy, Norway, and Finland, joined together
with traditional39U.S. enemies like Cuba in criticizing the American
death penalty. 1
In 1995, the Constitutional Court of South Africa overruled
'3 Since 1973, 122 prisoners sentenced to death in the U.S. have subsequently
been found to be innocent and released. This is generally considered as evidence
that at least some innocent defendants have been executed. See Amnesty
International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, supra note 122
136 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 618 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring
in the judgment).
137 See, e.g., supra note 9.
138 European Union in the U.S., EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty, at

http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm:
The EU is deeply concerned about the increasing number of
executions in the United States of America (USA), all the
more since the great majority of executions since
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 have been carried
out in the 1990s.
See also Letter from the EU Presidency to the Governor of Texas,
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/ DeathPenalty/PanettiTxGovLett.htm (pleading
for the life of Scott Panetti, who was scheduled to be executed on February 4,
2004). Panetti was granted a stay of execution by a federal court. See Mike
Tolson, Debate renewed over executing the mentally ill, Hous. CHRON., May
10, 2004, at Al.
139 Elizabeth Olson, Good Friends Join Enemies To Criticize US. on Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, § 1, at 9. That year also marked the first year the
United States was put on Amnesty International's list of human rights violators.
Id.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXIV

the death penalty. 14 Although South Africa's relatively new
constitution did not prohibit the death penalty, it did prohibit
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."' 4' The
President of the Court's Opinion stated: "Unjust imprisonment is a
great wrong .

.

. but the killing of an innocent person is

42

irremediable."' The President concluded his opinion by writing:
The rights to life and dignity are the most important
of all human rights, and the source of all other
personal rights in [the South African Constitution].
By committing ourselves to a society founded on
the recognition of human rights we are required to
value these two rights above all others. And this
must be demonstrated by the State in everything
that it does, including the way it punishes criminals.
This is not achieved by objectifying murderers and
putting them to death to serve as an example to
others in the expectation
that they might possibly be
43
deterred thereby. 1

The Makwanyane opinion relies heavily on the law of other
nations, including many references to the United States. The court
cited Gregg'44 and Furman.14 5 It also referred to the Eighth

Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the rejection of mandatory sentences. 146 One important difference
that the court points out between United States law and South
African Law is that the South African Constitution includes the
"unqualified right to life vested in every person.

,,14' The U.S.

Constitution does not directly include the right to life. Rather, it
See State v. Makwanyane, Constitutional Court of the Republic of South
Africa, Case No. CCT/3/94, [1995] 1 LRC 269, reprinted in part in STEINER &
140

ALSTON,

supra note 92, at 39.

141Makwanyane,

at
Makwanyane, at
143Makwanyane, at
144Makwanyane, at
145 Makwanyane, at
146 Makwanyane, at
147Makwanyane, at
142

9 8, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra at 39.
9 54, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra at 45.
9 144, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra at 53.

40, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra at 42.
43, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra at 43.
IT 40, 42, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra at 53.
9 80, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra, at 47.
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includes
a protection against taking of life without due process of
148
law.
In 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United States in
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for sentencing 52 Mexican
149
nationals to death in violation of 'the Vienna Convention.
Mexico has accused the United States of sentencing the defendants
to death without informing them of their right to legal assistance
from the Mexican consulate. 150 Mexico cited the earlier LaGrand
case, which involved two German nationals who were sentenced to
death in Arizona.' 51 In that case, two hours before the first
execution was to take place, the ICJ ordered the United States to
"take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is
not executed pending [a] final decision."' 152 Germany took the
order to the U.S. Supreme Court to ask for a stay, but the Court
ruled against Germany, and LaGrand was executed. 153 LaGrand
led to much German criticism of the death penalty in the United
States. In March 2004, the ICJ gave a judgment against the United
States, deciding that54the United States had violated the rights of 51
Mexican nationals.'
The Catholic Church has also spoken out against the death

148 U.S.CONST.

amends. V, XIV.

149Karen Meirik, ICJ Hears Death Penalty Suit against US, Institute for War &

Peace Reporting, availableat
19,
(Dec.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wldcourt/icj/2003/1219mexico.htm
2003); Kevin Sullivan, Mexico Challenges U.S. on Death Penalty Cases, WASH.
POST, Jan 10, 2003, at A17.
150 Meirik, supra note 149.
151Michael C. Dorf, When American States Execute Citizens of Foreign
FindLaw,
of
Gerardo
Valdez,
Countries:
The
Case
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20010724.html (July 24, 2001).
152 Id.

153Id.;

See also Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111

(1999).
154Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 2004 I.C.J 12
(Judgment of Mar. 13).
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penalty. 155 Pope John Paul II first spoke out against the death
penalty in 1983, becoming the first pope to publicly oppose the
death penalty.' 56 He subsequently pleaded for the life of several
death row prisoners in the United States, and at times won
temporary stays or commutations to life sentences for

defendants. 157 In 1995, the Pope released Evangelium Vitae, an
58
encyclical letter that includes strong anti-death penalty language.1
in the United
In response to the Pope's statements, Church leaders
59
have called for ending the death penalty. 1

States

The movement against the death penalty within this country
has also been steadily increasing. The American Bar Association
(ABA) has called for a nationwide moratorium on the death
penalty until it can be more fairly applied' 160 and the application
against the mentally retarded and juvenile offenders is
abolished. 16 1 The ABA is particularly concerned with the
application of the death penalty against the innocent, and cites the
large number of death penalty convictions that have been
overturned as evidence that there are not sufficient safeguards to
155 If

nothing else, this means that no longer can anyone argue, as Mayor Ed

Koch of New York City once did, that the Pope, the Supreme Court, and the
Bible are for the death penalty, "and to me that's good government." See Clyde
Haberman, The Koch Method for Winning Audiences and Influencing Voters,
N.Y. TIMES Apr. 20, 1981, at BI.
156 John PaulSpeaks Out Against Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1983, § 1,
at 5.
157 Gustav Niebuhr, Catholic Bishops Seek End to Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1999, at A12; Pope's Plea Stops Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at
A14.
1s
Pope
John
Paul
II,
Evangelium
Vitae,
available at
ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjphttp://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaul_
ii enc 25031995_evangelium-vitaeen.html (Mar. 25, 1995).
'fNiebuhr, supra note 157.
160 As an example, since 1976, over 100 death row convictions have been
overturned. See Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, American
Bar Association, at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/why.html (last visited
Mar. 14, 2006).
161 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling application of the
death penalty to the mentally retarded); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(abolishing the juvenile death penalty).
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protect the innocent.'
The American Psychological Association (APA) has also
called for a moratorium until policies and procedures are
implemented "that can be shown through psychological and other
deficiencies."' 163 Among
social science research to ameliorate .
its various objections to the death penalty, the APA includes the
fact that psychological studies have shown that death-qualified
juries are more conviction prone.' 64 The APA cites to one of the
studies that is rejected in Lockhart v. McCree;165 apparently this
social science is convincing to social scientists, but not to the
Court.
Nebraska's Republican-controlled legislature voted in 1999
(overriding the Governor's veto) for a moratorium on the death
penalty in order to study fairness issues. 166 Illinois Republican
Governor George Ryan put a moratorium in place in 2001, partly
in response to a much-publicized case where a death-sentenced
in response to a series
inmate was found to be innocent, and partly
67
Tribune.1
Chicago
the
in
articles
of critical
162

American

Bar

Association,

Why

a

Moratorium?,

at

http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/why.html. But see, Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1993) ("[Tlhe existence merely of newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on
federal habeas corpus." (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
The presumption of innocence does not apply to a person already fairly
convicted of the crime. See 506 U.S. at 399 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 610 (1974)).
163
The Death Penalty in the United States, APA Online,
http://www.apa.org/pi/deathpenalty.html.
164Id.("[R]esearch on the process of qualifying jurors for service on death
penalty cases shows that jurors who survive the qualification process . . .are
more conviction-prone than jurors who have reservations about the death
penalty.").
165See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 169 n.4 (1986).
166 Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We are Moving Towards
Moratoriaon Executions, and the PotentialAbolition of CapitalPunishment,33
CONN.
L. REv. 733, 739-40 (2001).
167 Id. at 740.
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Many traditional death penalty supporters have changed
their positions in recent years. Retired Justice Powell (who upheld
the death penalty in Gregg)168 in a 1991 interview said that he now
wondered if the death penalty could ever be fairly applied, and that
one of his greatest regrets was voting to uphold the death penalty
in cases like McCleskey v. Kemp. 169 Justice Blackmun, who voted
to uphold the death penalty in Gregg, as well as dissenting in
Furman,170 said in his dissent in McFarlandv. Scott:
When we execute a capital defendant in this
country, we rely on the belief that the individual
was guilty, and was convicted and sentenced after a
fair trial, to justify the imposition of state-sponsored
killing . . . . My 24 years of overseeing the
imposition of the death penalty from this court have
left me in grave doubt whether this reliance is
justified and whether the constitutional requirement
of competent legal counsel for capital defendants is
being fulfilled.1'
It would seem clear that in the years following Gregg, the
abolitionist (or at least moratorium-ist) viewpoint has greatly
expanded. None of these factors are likely to convince the
Supreme Court (or for that matter the legislative or executive
branches) to abolish the death penalty. One needs look no further
than "freedom fries' 72 to know that the United States will not
tolerate international interference. What these factors demonstrate,
however, is that death penalty abolitionists have a lot of weight
behind their opinion. Indeed, in light of the strong worldwide
rejections of the death penalty, it hardly seems possible to argue
168
169

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Appendix: American Bar Association Resolution & Report, 61 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (1998).

Although making it very clear that he personally objected to the death
penalty. See supranotes 2-3, and accompanying text.
171 Appendix, supranote 169, at 219, 221 (quoting McFarland
v. Scott, 512 U.S.
1256, 1264 (1994)).
172 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Threats and Responses: Washington
Talk; An Order of
Fries, Please,But Do Holdthe French,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at Al.
170
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that abolitionists are not able to "conscientiously apply the law."'
In fact, one begins to wonder if it is possible to conscientiously
apply the death penalty.

VI. LOCKHART V. MCCREE AND THE RIGHTS OF JURORS

In Lockhart, the Court stated that death qualification does
not violate the rights of jurors, 174 but this is not likely to be
dispositive. These statements would seem to be only dicta, and
they do not stand up well against a more thorough analysis of the
jurors' rights issue. As early as 1880, in Strauder v. West
Virginia,"75 the Supreme Court recognized that excluding AfricanAmericans from jury service was a violation of the rights of the
excluded jurors. 176 The Court said the exclusion of African
Americans:
denies the class of potential jurors the "privilege of
participating equally . . . in the administration of
justice," and it stigmatizes the whole class, even
those who do not wish to participate, by declaring
them unfit for jury service and thereby putting "a
brand upon them,77affixed by law, an assertion of
their inferiority."1
Unlike the Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual"
argument seen in Furman, the Constitutional issue that is most
commonly brought up in regards to death qualification is the Sixth
Amendment. 78 The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal
173 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)).
174 Lockhart, 476 U.S.
at 174.
171 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
176 Id. at 308-09.
177 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1972) (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at
308-09).
178 See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 162.
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury ....",,79The right to an impartial
jury has been interpreted to mean a "fair cross section" of the
community. 80 The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was
through the Fourteenth Amendment in
extended to the states
18 1
Louisiana.
v.
Duncan
The Court in Lockhart held that death-qualified juries do
not violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the fair
cross section analysis from Duncan applies only to jury panels or
venires, 182 not to petit juries.'i 3 "We have never invoked the faircross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for-cause or
peremptory challenges to jurors, or to require petit juries, as
opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the
community at large."' 4 The problem the Court sees in applying
the fair cross section doctrine to petit juries is that it is
inconvenient to the point of "practical impossibility"',8 5 to ensure
that every jury is completely representative of the community. The
weakness in this argument lies in the fact that the Court has not
been asked to assure that juries are more representative. Rather, a
challenge to death qualification is a challenge to an affirmative
policy that makes juries less representative.
In reaching the issue of jurors' rights, the Court states that
even if it considered fair-cross-section analysis as applicable to
179U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975) ("Both in the course of
exercising its supervisory powers over trials in federal courts and in the
constitutional context, the Court has unambiguously declared that the American
concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community.").
181 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("[W]e
hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which--were they to be tried in a federal court--would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee.").
182 The venire is the group of people from whom the final jury
is chosen. See
th
ed. 1999).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (7
'83 The petit jury is the jury that sits for the actual case. See Id. at 861.
184 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (citing Duren v. Missouri,
180

439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522, 538).
18s Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
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petit juries, abolitionists would still be excludable because they are
not members of a "distinctive group.'' 86 The Court says that
groups defined only by attitudes that interfere with their ability to
carry out their duties are not "distinctive."' 187 There is no clear
definition of what makes a distinctive group for fair cross section
purposes.1 88 Instead, Justice Rehnquist's opinion refers back to
Taylor v. Louisiana,189 to find three purposes of the fair cross
section requirement. Taylor states:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the
exercise of arbitrary power -- to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community as a
hedge against the overzealous or mistaken
prosecutor and in preference to the professional or
perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a
judge .... This prophylactic vehicle is not provided
if the jury pool is made up of only special segments
of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are
excluded from the pool. Community participation in
the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is
not only consistent with our democratic heritage but
is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service
Id. (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ("The essence of a 'fair-cross-section'
claim is the systematic exclusion of 'a "distinctive" group in the
186

community."')).
187
188

Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
1d; see also John A. Wasleff, Note: Lockhart v. McCree: Death

Qualification as a Determinant of the Impartiality and Representativeness of a
Jury in Death Penalty Cases, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1080-83 (1987)

("Unfortunately, the Court failed to define the term 'distinctive group,'
presumably intending in future cases to develop the term's meaning based on the
objectives of the cross-section requirement.").
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Rehnquist was alone in dissenting
in Taylor. It is also important to note that nowhere in Taylor is there a reference
to "immutable" characteristics or "historical disadvantage" as defining distinct
groups. Id.
189
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to only special groups or excluding identifiable
segments playing major roles in the community
cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of
jury trial. "Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn
from a pool broadly representative of the
community as well as impartial in a specific case
....[The] broad representative character of the jury
should be maintained, partly as assurance of a
diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in
the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility." 190
This is a broad definition of the "purpose of a jury," which
would seem to underscore the importance of the right to serve on a
jury. But from this statement Rehnquist narrows and distills the
three purposes of the fair cross section requirement:
(1) "[guarding] against the exercise of arbitrary
power" and ensuring that the "commonsense
judgment of the community" will act as "a hedge
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor," (2)
preserving "public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system," and (3) implementing our
belief that "sharing in the administration of justice
is a phase of civic responsibility."' 9'
192
The Court then explains that groups such as women,
African-Americans, 9 3 and Mexican-Americans 94 fit these purposes
better than abolitionist jurors. 195 Discrimination against these groups
is based on "reasons completely unrelated to the ability of members

'90 Id. at 530-31 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968);
quoting Thiel v. So. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
'9'Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75.
192 Id.at 175 (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. 522).
193
Id.(citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972)).
194 Id.(citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
'9'Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175.
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of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case."' 9 6 This
discrimination is based on "immutable characteristics," thus lending
the appearance of unfairness. 197 Finally, discrimination against these
others deprives members of "historically disadvantaged" groups
of
198
cases."'
criminal
in
juries
on
serve
to
citizens
as
"rights
their
These statements in Lockhart do not preclude further
discussion of the issue of jurors' rights. While the holding is that
there is no violation of the fair cross section requirement, jurors'
rights are not based on Sixth Amendment fair cross section
principles, but rather on the equal protection clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, or even possibly the voting rights
amendments. 199 The Court in Taylor made it clear that a jury must
be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, 200 citing the
9
1 6 id.
19 7

198

id.

id.

199 See Amar, supra note 11, at 204 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment is

meant to cover only civil rights, and that jury service is a political right which
should fall under the Voting Amendments, the Fifteenth through the Twentysixth).
200 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1975) (citing Smith
v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("[I]t is part of the established tradition in the use ofjuries
as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community."); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) ("[O]ur
-notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic
concepts of a democratic system and representative government"); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (explaining that federal law is "design[ed] to
make the jury 'a cross-section of the community' . . ."); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 474 (1953), ("[O]ur duty to protect the federal constitutional rights of
all does not mean we must or should impose on states our conception of the
proper source of jury lists, so long as the source reasonably reflects a crosssection of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that civic
duty."); Carter v. Jury Comm'n., 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (observing that the
exclusion of African-Americans from jury service "contravenes the very idea of
a jury--'a body truly representative of the community.' "); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a six person jury is allowable as long as the
jury is "large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts
at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative
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Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants
in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have
the right to grand and petit juries selected at random
from a fair cross section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court convenes. It is
further the policy of the United States that all
citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered
for service on grand and petit juries in the district
courts of the United States, and shall have an
obligation to20serve as jurors when summoned for
that purpose. 1
The committee reports of both houses of Congress show
that this Act was intended to mean that "the jury plays a political
function in the administration of the law and that the requirement
community
of a jury's being chosen from a fair cross section of20 the
2
justice."
of
system
American
the
to
is fundamental
In regards to "historical disadvantages," '20 3 the specific
group of death penalty abolitionists probably have none. However,
if the boundaries of the group are expanded, their disadvantage
becomes clearer. Abolitionist jurors are disadvantaged in the same
way as any reasonable political minority that is excluded from
debate on an issue of importance to them. While the founders did
not recognize the disadvantages of African Americans or women,
they took the idea of political minority very seriously. 20 4 Deathopposed jurors may be considered as historically disadvantaged if
they are considered as part of the group of all people excluded
cross-section of the community."); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11
(1972) (plurality opinion) ("[A] jury will come to such a (commonsense)
judgment as long as it consists of a group of laymen representative of a cross

section of the community who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate..
.on the question of a defendant's guilt").
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529; Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §

201

1861 (1968).
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529-30.

202
203
204

Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175.
See discussion infra, Part IX, The Problem of Tyranny.
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from jury service.
In the Lockhart opinion, the idea that abolitionist jurors are
not a distinctive group is stated after the holding that the Sixth
Amendment's "fair cross-section of the community" standard does
not apply to petit juries.20 5 In this textual position, it would seem to
be only dicta. Given the Court's summary treatment of
Witherspoon's dicta in Wainright v. Witt,20 6 these brief statements
about the rights of jurors are not likely to be binding. Witt involved
a challenge for cause to a potential juror who was not absolutely
certain that she would automatically vote against the death
penalty. 20 7 Footnote 21 of Witherspoon states that jurors could be
excluded if they made it "unmistakably clear ...

that they would

automatically vote against capital punishment" (emphasis in
original).20 8 The Court argued that even though lower courts may
have relied on footnote 21, its own cases "demonstrate [d] no
ritualistic adherence" to the "unmistakably clear" principle.20 By
this same reasoning, the principle that death-qualification does not
violate jurors' rights, which has not since been used in any
meaningful way by the Supreme Court, 2 1 could be rejected as
dicta.
The Court's statements in regard to the lack of juror rights
are also not likely to be binding on state courts. In Greene v.
Georgia, 211 the court stated that a state supreme court was not
bound to defer to the trial court as required in Witt, because that
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173.
U.S. 412 (1985).
Id. at 415-16.
208 Id. at 416 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968)).
209 Id. at 419-22 (citing, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978);
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980)).
210 But see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 416 (1987), which does briefly
205

206 469
207

refer to the distinctive group/substantial rights as citizens language from
Lockhart. This reference is very brief, and would not seem to be central to the

holding.

2' 519 U.S. 145 (1996).
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standard referred to federal habeas corpus.2 ' 2 The states are bound
by Supreme Court decisions in regards to "federal constitutional
challenges." 213 States may, however, come to a different
conclusion about the rights of jurors, or the death penalty as a
whole, under their own constitutions and laws.2 14 This means that a
Supreme Court decision overruling death qualification would bind
the states, but the Supreme Court cannot force the exclusion of any
jurors except those who would violate defendants' constitutional
rights. States cannot be required to exclude jurors who are opposed
to the death penalty, because no rights are violated by this
exclusion.
The process of death qualification is obviously tilted
against the viewpoints of death penalty abolitionists. The Court
states in Lockhart that the process of death qualification is
instituted to uphold states' "legitimate interest" in having a single
jury decide both the guilt and penalty phases of a trial. 215 "There is
very little danger therefore .

. .

that 'death qualification' was

instituted as a means to skew the composition of capital-case
juries. ' 2 16 Taken as a reference to skewing against the defendant,

this is arguably true, but there is a clear slant against the anti-death
juror. The state is asking the individual juror to be complicit in
what she believes is tantamount to murder. Failing willingness to
act in this way, the only other choice given is to turn her back.
Jurors may serve as long as "they are willing to temporarily set
aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law." 217 It is
deceptive to speak of temporarily setting aside beliefs in this
instance. Given that it is unlikely that the individual will have a
2 12

id.

Id. at 146, ("Witt is 'the controlling authority as to the death-penalty
qualification of prospective jurors .... '") (quoting the Georgia Supreme Court
below, 469 S.E.2d 129, 134 (1996)).
214 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 298 n.52 (1972)
(citing People v.
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972)), in which the California Supreme Court
overruled the death penalty based on the state constitution equivalent of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
215 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175-76 (1986).
216 Id. at 176.
213

217 id.
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218
meaningful opportunity to politically overrule the death penalty,
when will the juror's belief ever have real meaning or value
outside of the jury situation? The Court also states that abolitionists
may serve as jurors in other criminal cases, and so are not deprived
of their "basic rights of citizenship." 219 This is again a false hope.
The juror should be able to add her strongly held beliefs to the
debate in a case where it is meaningful. The beliefs that exclude
her have no value in other criminal cases.
Although the creation of a more conviction-prone jury
would be of obvious concern to the defendant -- and has been
heard and rejected by the Supreme Court as a concern to the
defendant --220 it is also an issue of concern to the rejected juror.
The Court equates an abolitionist viewpoint with the serious
societal wrongs of being unable to follow the law or the jurors'
oath. This in turn puts a certain amount of stigma on the
abolitionist juror. Essentially the Court is saying that to have a
different opinion about what is in the best interest of the State is
tantamount to being a lawbreaker. This unnecessary criticism not
only affects the rights of the individual juror, but it also weakens
the position of the group in regards to action outside the courts. It
is difficult to win a political battle as a group that is branded as
unable to follow the law. Legislatures and executives have the
backing of the highest court in the land whenever they uphold the
death penalty or death-qualified juries.

See, e.g., The 2000 Campaign: Other Issues; From Social Security to
Environment, the Candidates' Positions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, § 1, at 45
(explaining that in the 2000 presidential elections both George W. Bush and Al
Gore supported the death penalty).
211

219 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176.

220 id. at 170 n.7.
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VII. RULE OF LAW
While the above discussion shows that the death penalty
may be precluded by the international rule of law, 22 1 there is also
room to doubt whether the death penalty still fits within this
country's own rule of law. "While [capital punishment] may
weaken both democracy and the rule of law, and while it may
distract us from confronting the fragility and contingency of basic
cultural categories, the machinery of death does its work at an ever
escalating pace. ' 222 While the rule of law in the past allowed the
death penalty, and may even have relied on the death penalty, the
penalty's time of value has ended.223 The death penalty in law
assumes that the punishing of a criminal with death will slow the
pace of "private vengeance." 224 Under this theory, State 'murder'
is allowed because it will eventually lead to fewer deaths by
precluding small private wars or 'family feuds.' This limited
revenge theory may be a more important justification for the death
penalty, especially at the time of the country's founding, than
either deterrence or retribution. However, under the limited
revenge justification for the death penalty, ithas lost its value not
because of society's changing values, but rather because of the
changing facts of everyday life. The average person will not start a
protracted violent vendetta based on a crime committed against
them. Those who will take the law into their own hands are no
more likely to be deterred by the threat of the death penalty than
they would be deterred by any other punishment under law.
While a person may set aside their personal beliefs to

221 See infra Part IV, International Law Documents; infra Part V, The Current
State of the Death Penalty Within and Beyond the United States.
222 Austin Sarat, CapitalPunishment as a Factof Legal, Political,and Cultural
Lie: An Introduction, in THE KILLING STATE 3, 17 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
223 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980) ("[W]e cannot
escape the reality that the law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long
after the reasons which gave them birth have disappeared and after experience
suggest the need for change.").
224 Sarat, supra note 222.
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follow what they believe is the rule of law,2 25 there is a serious
issue of whether it is right for the State to ask jurors to give up
certain beliefs. Lockhart explains that unlike immutable
characteristics, belief that the death penalty is wrong is "within the
individual's control. 226 Jurors may serve provided that they
temporarily set aside their beliefs.2 However, like religion or
acceptable cultural practices, a belief that the death penalty is
wrong goes to the heart of an individual's identity. The State
should not attempt to damage, lessen, or strip away these beliefs.228
According to the Supreme Court, an "automatic" vote
against the death penalty runs counter to the rule of law. 229 It is
important in the death penalty debate to pinpoint the meaning and
the boundaries of the rule of law. As one scholar wrote, "[w]e have
a pretty good idea of what we mean by 'free markets' and
'democratic elections.' But legality and the 'rule of law' are ideals
that are opaque even to legal philosophers." 230 In order to decide
what the rule of law has to say about the death penalty, we must
See, e.g., Justice Blackmun's dissent in Furman, supra notes 2-3 and
accompanying text.
226 Lockart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
225

227 id.

228

Immutable is defined as "never changing or varying; unchangeable."

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 714 (4' ed. 2001). There are
two different ways to think of "unchangeable:" that which cannot be changed,
and that which should not be changed at the will of the state.
229 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
230 George P. Fletcher, Searching for the Rule of Law in the Wake of

Communism, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 145, 145 (1992) (detailing a case in which
the Hungarian Constitutional Court held that the death penalty was per se
invalid):
It cannot be the case that at all times, in all places, the rule of
law demands only that judges apply statutes or their
constitution precisely as written. As Romanian Professor
Valeriu Stoica argued recently in Bucharest, the independence
of judges does not require that they be reduced to the servants
of the written word.
Id. at 161.
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first understand what is meant by rule of law. 1
Black's Law Dictionary gives five definitions of "rule of
law," including, most importantly:
(1) A substantive legal principle...
(2) The supremacy of regular as opposed to
arbitrary power...
(3) The doctrine that every person is subject to the
ordinary law within the jurisdiction...
(4) The doctrine that general constitutional
principles are the result of judicial decisions
determining the rights of private individuals in the

courts ... 232

In Lockhart, the court is most likely referring to a concept similar
to that seen in definitions three and four; the 'ordinary laws' as
written in many state jurisdictions obviously uphold the death
penalty. The current dominant interpretation by the Supreme Court
of constitutional rights also supports the death penalty. Probably
the strongest arguments against the death penalty can come from
the second definition. In upholding the death penalty, courts and
legislatures ignore the balance of both fairness and reason. Their
power, therefore, is more arbitrary than regular. Arguing to the law
in jurisdictions or the law as interpreted by courts leads to a sort of
circular reasoning. This argument says that the rule of law is what
courts say it is because courts have told us that that is the rule of
law. This places legal traditions above the rights of persons. It is in
the substantive and non-arbitrary law from the first two definitions
that rights, freedoms, and protections are found, and these benefits
are the reason that we want to follow the rule of law. After all, if
the rule of law does not uphold that which is right, or good, or
equitable, there is seemingly no purpose for it. In the example of
the death-qualified jury, the policy that is claimed to be upheld by
the rule of law is not substantially supported by either the rights of
231

It is also worth considering whether the rule of law is limited to the laws of

the United States, or if the decisions and opinions of other nations are important
to this concept.
h
232

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1332 (7 ed. 1999).

2005-2006

Death QualifiedJuries

individuals or the greatest good of the population.
It can be seen through Supreme Court decisions that the
rule of law is not clearly on the side of death penalty supporters. In
McGautha v. California,233 The Supreme Court held that death
sentences could be left entirely to jury discretion,234 and that the
same jury could be used for sentencing and guilt decisions in a
case. 23 5 Justice Brennan's dissent in McGautha demonstrates an
important concern that upholding the death penalty actually
weakens the rule of law. 236 Brennan states, "the Court is led to
conclude that the rule of law and the power of the States to kill are
in irreconcilable conflict. This conflict the Court resolves in favor
of the States' power to kill. 237
Brennan's argument is based on the idea that states should
not be able to simply "abdicate" their responsibility to come 2up
with laws that specify when the death penalty should be applied. 38
In leaving the jury with full discretion to decide the punishment
this abdication is exactly what has taken place. This means that the
State allows (or requires) the death penalty to be applied in
arbitrary and capricious ways, rather than developing a legitimate
rule of law by which the penalty should be applied. This
"unguided, unbridled, unreviewable exercise of naked power" 239
goes directly against the Fifth240and Fourteenth Amendments'
protections of due process in law.
233 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
234 Id. at 207-08. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
235 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 209-210. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying

text.
236

AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

AMERICAN
STATE 132, 288 nn. 1-17 (2001).
237
McGautha,402 U.S. at 248.
238 Id. at 251-252.
239 Id. at 252 ("Almost a century ago, we found an almost identical California

procedure constitutionally inadequate to license a laundry. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 366-367, 369-370 (1886). Today we hold it adequate to license a

life.").
2,40
id.
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Brennan's dissenting view in McGautha became important
-a year later when he voted with the majority in Furman v. Georgia,
but Furman did not lead to the overruling of the death penalty that
Brennan had hoped for. 24 1 It therefore came about that 20 years
later, Justice Marshall (another justice who voted to overrule the
death penalty in Furman),242 was again in the dissenting minority
when making an argument similar to Brennan's.2 43 Marshall's
dissent in Payne v. Tennessee argues that the Court is guilty of
ignoring the rule of law in overruling previous cases that had put
greater restrictions on the death penalty. 244 Marshall is arguing
here that death penalty supporters, not abolitionists, stand counter
to the rule of law. Marshall points out that, according to the rule of
law, Supreme Court precedent should be overruled only when

24'

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972):

In comparison to all other punishments today, then, the
deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is
uniquely degrading to human dignity. I would not hesitate to
hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a "cruel and
unusual" punishment, were it not that death is a punishment of
longstanding usage and acceptance in this country. I therefore
turn to the second principle -- that the State may not arbitrarily
inflict an unusually severe punishment.
Id. (Brennan J., concurring in the judgment).
242 In Furman, the five Justices in the majority each wrote separate
opinions.
Brennan and Marshall expressed the opinion that the death penalty in any form
violated the Constitution as a cruel and unusual punishment. The other Justices
in the majority held only that the death penalty was arbitrary as applied at that
time. Because the death penalty still exists, it is clear that the less far reaching
opinions came to be the dominant view of Furman. See generally 408 U.S. 238.
243 SARAT, supra note 236 at 288 n. 18 (citing Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S.
809, 844 (1991)).
244 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 809, 844-45 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
Payne overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Payne, 501 U.S. at 830. Booth and Gathers both
restricted prosecutors from bringing "victim impact" evidence in the penalty
phase of a trial. Id. at 811. In granting the writ of certiorari in Payne, the Court
"expressly invited [the] respondent to renew the attack" on the Booth and
Gathers doctrine. Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Payne, 498 U.S.
1076, 1076 (1991) ("[T]he parties are requested to brief and argue whether
[Booth] and [Gathers] should be overruled.")).
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245
there exists some "special justification:"
Such justifications include the advent of
"subsequent changes or development in the law"
that undermine a decision's rationale,246 . ..the need
"to bring [a decision] into agreement with
experience and with facts newly ascertained, 247 ...
and a showing that a particular precedent has
become a "detriment to coherence and consistency
in the law . . "248 The majority cannot seriously
claim that any of these traditional bases for
overruling a precedent applies to Booth or
Gathers.249

Marshall goes on to argue that the only change that led to the
overruling of precedent was a change in "this Court's own
personnel. '250 A simple change in judges has traditionally been
held 5insufficient to overrule stare decisis or the existing rule of
2
law. '
As a general rule, dissenting opinions do not make strong
legal arguments, but the majority in Payne lends power to
Marshall's and Brennan's dissents by arguing that two anti-death
cases could be overruled, due in part to strong dissents when the
cases were decided. 252 "Booth and Gathers were decided by the
narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic
underpinnings of those decisions. They have been questioned by
245

Payne, 501 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v.

Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,212 (1984)).
246 Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
247 Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)
(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
248 Id. (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173.
249 id.

210Id.at 850.
251 Id.

252

Id. at 828-30.
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Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied consistent
application by the lower courts." 253 By this same rationale, the
holdings in Lockhart v. McCree2 54 or McCleskey v. Kemp 255 could

be similarly challenged, and eventually overturned. McCleskey was
decided by a 5 to 4 court,256 as was Booth.2 5 7 While Lockhart was
decided by a larger margin (6 to 3),258 two of the judges in the
majority later changed their opinions about death penalty cases.
After retiring, Justice Powell questioned whether the death penalty
could ever be fairly applied, and stated his regret for cases in
which he had upheld the death penalty. 259 Justice Blackmun
switched positions, concurring in Lockhart, while dissenting in
McCleskey. Blackmun also said that his years of experience had
led him to believe that the death penalty was not usually fairly
applied.26 ° Clearly, although the margin in Lockhart may not have
been so narrow, there has been subsequent criticism by members
of the court.
The court in Lockhart may be correct in saying that some
jurors are "unable to follow the law"2 6' when it comes to the death
penalty, but this does not mean that these jurors should be rejected
from service. While the Court seems to say that these jurors are
unable to follow the law because they place their own values above
the rule of law, it could be argued that they are unable to follow the
law because the law is impossible to follow. To apply the death
penalty would show an inability to follow the rule of law, while to
254

Id.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).

255

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

253

In McCleskey, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia were
in the majority, while Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented. Id.
257 In Booth, the majority consisted of Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens; Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia
dissented. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
258 The majority in Lockhart consisted of Justices Rehnquist, Burger, White,
Powell, and O'Connor; Justice Blackmun concurred without giving a written
opinion; Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stevens dissented. See Lockhart, 476
U.S. 162.
259 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
261 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176.

256
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47

refuse to apply it shows inability to follow the law as stated in
some states. The juror is unable to follow the law because of a
a "detriment to coherence and consistency in the
defect
62
2 or
.]55
law[

VIII. ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT
It may seem crass to make any economic argument in such
a clear-cut issue of life and death, but there are in fact several
important economic issues involved in the death penalty. Anyone
who is opposed to the death penalty cannot ignore economic
arguments because death penalty supporters so frequently make
them. The idea of replacing the death penalty with life in prison
without chance of parole faces the retribution-based argument that
a murderer does not deserve to live out his life at the expense of
the State.263 This argument is made in spite of the fact that it has
been shown to be more expensive to execute a prisoner than to pay
for life imprisonment. 264 Death supporters generally attribute the
huge costs of the death penalty to drawn out and 'unnecessary'
appeals. It is also important to note that the death penalty is not the
only issue of life and death that comes under economic analysis.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 809, 849 (1991) (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
263 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, First Things, May 2002, at
262

17, http://www.firstthings .com/ftissues/ft0205/articles/scalia.html ("One might
think that commitment to a really horrible penal system ... might be almost as
bad as death. But nice clean cells with television sets, exercise rooms, meals
designed by nutritionists, and conjugal visits? That would seem to render the

death penalty more, rather than less, necessary.")

See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("When all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it costs more
to execute a man than to keep him in prison for life."); Ronald J.Tabak,
Symposium: How Empirical Studies Can Affect Positively the Politics of the
Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1431, 1439 (1998) (citing a Duke study
demonstrating that in North Carolina an execution cost $2.16 million more than
264

life imprisonment).
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Issues of environmental pollution and health care are some of the
situations where economic factors play an
other life and 26death
5
important role.

Itis generally accepted that poor people are executed more
often than the economically privileged.266 In fact, Justice Powell
wrote in his dissent to Furman:
Certainly the claim is justified that this criminal
sanction falls more heavily on the relatively
impoverished and underprivileged elements of
society. The "have-nots" in every society always
have, been subject to greater pressure to commit
crimes and to fewer constraints than their more
affluent fellow citizens. This is, indeed, a tragic
byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but it
is not an argument of constitutional proportions
under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. The
same discriminatory impact argument could be
with respect to
made with equal force and logic
267
those sentenced to prison terms.
This argument seems to assume that unfairness in prison statistics,
and economic unfairness in general, excuse unfair application of
the death penalty. Since "death is different" 268 as a punishment,
however, it should lead the way in fair application. If we cannot
enforce fairness in employment, health care, imprisonment,
265

Even intellectual property can be a matter of life and death. American Drug

companies fought to keep prohibitively high patent-based prices on AIDS drugs,
while millions in third world countries were dying. See, e.g., Michael Wines,
Agreement Expands Generic Drugs in South Africa to Fight AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 11, 2003, at A24.
266 Samuel R. Ross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views
on the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR?, supra

note 14 at 7, 27, 36. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 447 (1972)
(Powell, J. dissenting).
267 Furman,408 U.S. at 447.

26s Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of death is
different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of
criminal justice.").
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minimum standards of living, education, or access to justice, we
should at least require fairness when we directly and actively take
lives. There is also a dangerous cycle involved here: the
"minorities and the poor"2 69 are seen as committing more crimes.
Simultaneously, the idea that certain groups commit more crime
leads to more segregation, social disadvantage, and poverty.
The O.J. Simpson case, to draw on relatively recent cultural
history, demonstrates the economic disparities of murder and law.
Mr. Simpson was found not guilty in a situation where another
person of his color of lower economic means would almost
certainly have been found guilty.270 For the purpose of this
illustration, it is not important whether Simpson actually
committed the murders of which he was accused. It is only
important to see that money bought him a brilliant defense that
would not be available to a poor person in the same situation. In
fact, the injustice of the situation is clarified by assuming that he is
not guilty of the crime, as is true for legal purposes. In comparison,
it can be seen just how easy it would be for a poor person to be
found guilty of a crime she did not commit.
It is illustrative to compare statistics about those who are
excludable from death-qualified juries to those who are executed.
Death penalty opponents are more likely to be from lower
economic classes. l Also, African Americans tend to oppose the
death penalty more than Caucasians, and women are more likely to
be opposed than men.272 All of these groups may be seen as
socially disadvantaged. Taken together, the unequal numbers in
executions, and in excludable death penalty beliefs, mean that the
most powerful members of society are deciding whether the death
Furman,408 U.S. at 447.
270 The Rodney King case from the same time period shows related values;
269

police officers were found not guilty of using excessive force despite being
caught on videotape violently beating an African American male.
271 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV.
L. REV.
413,440 (1990).
272

id.
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penalty should be allowed, who should be executed, and who
should be allowed to participate in the decision process. Those
who are opposed to the death penalty are not only in a minority
group by belief, but in the power to effect change in society. They
are deprived of the legislative means to end the death penalty due
to social weakness, and then also deprived of access to the jury, the
last forum which could be of use to them.
Amartya Sen, in his book Development as Freedom, has
advanced the idea that freedom and development are correlative.
The upholding of essential rights can have important effects on the
development of a country. For example, no free country that
upholds essential political rights has ever experienced a significant
famine. 273 The continued use of the death penalty with only
arbitrary reasons to back it up can be read as a sign of loss of
power.274 The United States has long intertwined the positions of
moral leadership with economic leadership. 275 It has frequently
argued in the international arena that civil and political rights
should be placed above economic and social rights. In the case of
the death penalty, the United States subjects itself to significant
criticism by refusing to live up to the accepted laws of the
international community.2 76 The death-qualified jury goes one step
further by violating the civil and political rights that the United
States claims to have prioritized.277
New sociological studies have placed the United States as a
less modern, or less developed country than nations in Western
Europe which have a greater emphasis on freedom and secular
"non traditional" thought. 278 One new modernization study
273

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 16 (1999).

274

Anthony N. Bishop, The DeathPenalty in the United States: An International

Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1220 (2002).
275 Id. at 1221-22
276

277
278

Id.

Id.

Rodger Doyle, Measuring Modernity: The US. is Not Number One, SCl.

AM., Dec. 2003, at 40. It seems that, regarding the death penalty, some Supreme
Court justices are actively seeking this "un-modem" position. See, e.g., Scalia,
God's Justice and Ours, supra note 263 ("[I]t is no accident, I think, that the
modem view that the death penalty is immoral is centered in the West ....[I]t
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measures nations on a scale of "Self-Expression v.
Survival/Security, ' 279 as
well
as
a
"Traditional
v.
Secular/Rational" scale. 280 The United States ranks relatively well
on the self-expression scale, but relatively poorly on the traditional
v. secular scale. 28 1 Countries like Sweden, Norway, and the
Netherlands rank as the most modem, beating the United States on
both scales. 282 Clearly the death penalty, which is often supported
for traditional religious reasons, is a strong factor in making the
United States appear less modem.
Clinging to the death penalty could also cause economic
283
harm.
Other nations could bring formal sanctions against the
United States through exceptions to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Article XX of GATT allows trade restrictions
when necessary to protect public morals and human life.28 4 But
formal sanctions are not the only way the economy could be
harmed. Individual consumers or corporate shareholders could
demonstrate that they were offended by seeking goods and services
elsewhere. 2 85 Because the United States continues to execute
foreign nationals, some may restrict their travel here. Our
continued embrace of the death penalty may hinder our efforts to

seems to me that the more Christian a country is the less likely it is to regard the
death penalty as immoral.").
279 The desire to self-express demonstrates a freedom from physical need. Doyle,
supra note 278.
280 Id.
291 On the Traditional v. Secular scale, the United States ranks at about the same
level as Turkey and India. Id.
282 "The Lower position of the English-speaking countries is a function of,
among other influences, their higher religious commitment, particularly in the
U.S." Id.
283 Id.
284 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(a), (c), 61
Stat. A-i1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
Bishop, supra note 274, at 1223-24.

285
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fight terrorism by alienating our allies. 2 86 It is even arguable that
this continued moral isolationism could indirectly lead to increases
in terrorism. Of course, the United States can weather a substantial
amount of foreign trade pressure, but it is doubtful whether we
should fight international pressure in support of a policy that
doesn't do a substantial amount of good. To make a brief
tangential comparison we can look at the Kyoto Protocol, which is
an agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 2" The United
States has signed the protocol, but refused to put it into effect, and
has been much criticized for this policy. 288 Reducing carbon
dioxide would subject the United States to huge costs, with little
direct economic benefit. Therefore, a calculation can be made that
it is more profitable to weather any economic sanctions, up to the
point where the sanctions reach an equal level with the costs of
reducing emissions. In contrast, the death penalty seemingly brings
no economic value to this country, and so in the face of negative
economic consequences, it could be seen as an unnecessary
externality.
By the "development as freedom" argument, the death
penalty is moving the United States backwards in two ways at
once. The political restriction of jurors' rights is a restriction of
freedom, and therefore damages development. The use of the death
penalty makes us look less developed to other nations, causing
them to cool their economic relationships. 289 This damage to
economic development restricts freedom. 29 0 Both the political and
economic harms arguably are most strongly felt by the already
disadvantaged groups that are excluded by death qualification.
This sets up another dangerous cycle; the death penalty's economic
286

Id. at 1224 ("Diplomatic isolation is not something the United States can

afford at a time when it needs foreign cooperation and support to conduct its
War on Terrorism.").
287 See KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html.
288
See
Kyoto
Protocol,
Status
of
Ratification,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential background/kyoto 1rotocol/
application/pdf/kpstats.pdf (last modified Apr. 18, 2006).
9 Bishop, supra note 274, at 1220.
290
See generally SEN, supra note 273.

2005-2006

Death QualifiedJuries

harms cause further political harms to a group that is already
politically and economically disadvantaged. At the same time, the
political harm caused by exclusion from jury service causes further
economic harm to the same group.
IX. THE PROBLEM OF TYRANNY.
There is a serious problem of tyranny involved in
precluding death penalty abolitionists from capital jury service. To
clarify the problem all we need to do is imagine the same system
applied to actual voting. 29 1 After all, the death penalty is often
considered to be a political idea that should be left up to
legislatures. 292 We can re-imagine the situation as consisting of
three different political parties: those who could never vote for the
death penalty (Witherspoon-excludables), those who would always
vote for the death penalty (Morgan-excludables) and those who
would consider the death penalty (Witherspoon/Morganincludables, or non-excludables). We can take it from the current
law, both in the majority of state statutes, and in Supreme Court
cases, that the non-excludable side is the majority; they are
analogous to the side that has won the election or referendum. The
process of death-qualifying juries is akin to the winning side
making a law that precludes the losers from voting in future
elections. Clearly this would not be allowed to stand. It is a
foundational tenet of our constitutional system that the minority
must be able to add its views to the debate. 93
291
292

See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11.
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,

dissenting) ("If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either join with
[the Justices voting against the death penalty] or, at the very least, restrict the
use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes.").
293 For example, the Constitution creates the Senate, which
entails important
protections for states with smaller populations. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. The
Judicial branch is led by justices with lifetime tenure, freeing them from the
pressure to make popular decisions. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Constitutional
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The very fact that death qualification exists demonstrates
that death penalty abolitionism is not a narrowly held view. If one
in a hundred or one in a thousand, or for that matter even one in ten
potential jurors would refuse to apply the death penalty, the
chances of these individuals being picked from the jury wheel for a
death penalty case would be sufficiently low, and prosecutors
could use their peremptory strikes to weed out the rare abolitionist
who did get through. 294 The development of a whole set of laws
just to deal with the problems caused by anti-death jurors
demonstrates that this view is not narrowly held.
Jury service is a duty, but it is also an important political
295
right. Juries give an opportunity to debate and take meaningful
action on an issue that may be years away from being legislatively
changed. Because there will be a certain amount of inertia involved
in any legislative change (things will tend to stay as they are; new
laws tend to be made slowly), juries may be the only place where
meaningful debate can occur for many years to come.
It could also be argued that opinions against the death
penalty are pre-considered mitigating factors. Rather than
'automatically' choosing to vote against the death penalty, the
abolitionist juror has simply made a well-considered choice before
coming to the case. This is acceptable because there are many
death penalty factors that have nothing to do with any specific
case. For example, the Court assumed in MeCleskey v. Kemp that
amendments must be ratified by three-fourths of the states before going into
effect, and "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. V. See also U.S. CONST. amend I (protecting
free speech) and U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .....
294 Cf
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 14 (1868) (where 47 jury
members were struck from the panel during the death qualification process).
295 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530-31
(1975) ("Community participation in the administration of the criminal law ...
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system."); Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968) ("It is... the policy of the
United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for
service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and
shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.").
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the death penalty was applied unfairly to racial minorities (even
though this was not considered a constitutional violation)., 96 Under
this rationale, it is possible to see the race of the defendant, or the
fact that it is statistically likely that some innocent defendants have
been executed, as mitigating factors. A juror who would consider
voting for the death penalty has either never really thought about
the issue, or has made certain pre-considerations that the death
penalty is acceptable. If pro-death jurors' pre-considered ideas are
allowed into the jury, abolitionists' ideas should also be allowed.
In Wainwright v. Witt, the court explained that it is not
desirable either to allow in those who are so "biased" that they
can't follow the law, or exclude those whose philosophical views
"have no bearing" on the case. 297 Arguably, the juror's opinions on
the death penalty do not have any bearing on the case; they have
nothing to do with the issue of guilt or innocence, or whether the
crime should be punished. The excludable jurors merely have a
different political view about what the punishment should be.
Beyond the reasonableness of the life view, there lies the idea of a
balance of rights. No rights are violated when a person is not put to
death. The victim's family may have a right to see the criminal
punished, but they do not have the right to choose death any more
298
than an abolitionist family would have the right to choose life.
It could be argued that a choice of life violates the rights of
the public by lessening the deterrence value of the death penalty,
296

See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (explaining that

even though a statistical study showed some racial disparities, these disparities
did not demonstrate a constitutional violation).
297 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425 n.5 (1985).
298

Although a victim's family may be consulted, the decision on what penalty to

seek is ultimately left to the prosecutor. See Peter Hodgkinson, Europe--A Death
Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26
Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 625, 649(2000) ("One simply cannot have a prosecution
policy based on the wishes of the families and friends of homicide victims, when
some are for and some against capital punishment."); Murder Victims' Families
for Reconciliation, http://www.mvfr.orp (last modified Jan. 23, 2006).
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but, aside from the fact that there is no proven deterrence value to
the death penalty, the inclusion of abolitionist jurors would only
make an extremely rare punishment slightly more rare. In 2002,
there were an estimated 16,137 murders in the United States 299 and
59 executions. 30 0 Presumably then, any actual deterrence does not
rely on the percentage of murderers executed, since this percentage
would work out to less than one half of one percent.
One of the strongest deterrence arguments offered in
support of the death penalty is "if life imprisonment is the
maximum penalty for a crime such as murder, an offender who is
serving a life sentence cannot then be deterred from murdering a
fellow inmate or a prison officer." 30 1 In Furman, Justice Marshall
responds to this by stating that most murderers do not usually
commit further murders while in prison, and that "the existence of
the death penalty has virtually no effect on the homicide rate in
prisons. ' 3°2 Any murderer who is in prison in a death penalty state
was obviously not deterred by the possibility of facing the death
penalty. He could only be deterred in prison by mandatory death
sentences, meaning that an in-prison murder carried a much greater
statistical chance of death as punishment, but mandatory death
sentences are prohibited.30 3
Additionally, there are other punishments within prison
systems, such as loss of privileges or solitary confinement.
Prisoners who are on death row are also in prison, and have less to
lose than even those who are sentenced to life without parole.
Death-row inmates are subjected to a greater level of control than
the rest of the prison population, but there is no reason that life299 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States: Murder,

http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses reported/violent-crime/murder.htmi
(last updated Feb. 17, 2006).
300 Amnesty International USA, Executions in the USA in the Year 2002, at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/listpending.do?value=2004
(last updated
Apr. 8, 2006).
30 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 348 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital
Punishment, Pt II, para. 139 at 118).
302 Id.at 352.
303 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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without-parole prisoners could not similarly be subjected to more

careful control.
Overcrowding also may lead to higher prison
murder rates, but this is not an issue that can be dealt with by the
death penalty at its current pace, or even if executions were
drastically sped up. The prison population at the end of 2004 was
2,135,901.
At the end of 2002, state prisons ranged from one
percent to 16 percent over capacity, with federal prisons at 33
percent over capacity. 306 At the end of 2004, the population of
death row was 3,314.307 Even if every prisoner on death row were
executed tomorrow, the total inmate population would decrease by
less than two-tenths of one percent.
The rights of the State itself should also be considered,
including the right to retributively punish criminals, but the
individual rights of jurors should easily overcome this. The states
have been unable to demonstrate that the death penalty has any real
value. Although they may have enough evidence to overcome the
rights of a convicted criminal, the rights of innocent jurors are
more difficult to overcome.
While it is frequently argued that the death penalty must be
upheld as a form of retribution for murder, 30 8 a death penalty

304

Itwould cost more to better control prisoners, but it would probably not cost

enough to exceed the huge expenditures made by states in prosecuting death
penalty cases. See, e.g., Tabak, supra note 264.
5 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/ prisons.htm (last updated, Dec. 7, 2005). See also,
Richard Willing, Inmates Number over 2 Million, a Record for USA, USA
TODAY, Apr. 7, 2003, at A13 (The United States has the world's highest
incarceration rate, at 702 prisoners per 100,000 citizens).
306 Paige M. Harrison and Allen J.Beck, Prisoners in 2002, Bureau of
Justice
Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ p02.htm (July 27,
2003).
307 Capital Punishment Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2006).
308 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 394-95 (1972) (Burger,
C.J.,
dissenting) ("It would be reading a great deal into the Eighth Amendment to
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abolitionist is not necessarily opposed to the idea of retribution. It
could even be argued that death is less effective as a form of
retribution than life imprisonment. Consider the example of a
'suicide bomber'; a person who wants to die for a cause is arguably
not adequately punished by the death penalty. The death penalty is
also ineffective as retribution because it generates sympathy for the
accused. While life imprisonment is likely to generate protest only
from those who believe the convict is innocent, almost any
imposition of the death penalty is going to generate some protest,
and this protest can be seen as sympathy, whether or not it actually
is.309

Death qualification gives a "special advantage" to the
prosecutor, while hiding behind the argument that it is impractical
to ensure unbiased juries.310 There is significant evidence that
death qualification makes a jury more likely to convict a
defendant, even in cases where the state decides not to follow
through with its decision to seek death.31' While the Court in
Lockhart raises serious questions about this evidence, 312 it is
interesting to note that the tactical advantage, even if only
perceived, means that death will be sought more frequently, if only
to try to get a 'better' jury. The prosecution may have no interest in
the death or life of prisoners, as long as they are convicted. A
hold that the punishments authorized by legislatures cannot constitutionally
reflect a retributive purpose.").
309 See, e.g., New Mexico Coalition to Repeal the Death Penalty, availableat
http://nmrepeal.org/MVFR.htm:
Most criticism of the death penalty focuses on how it affects
the person on death row. Our concern is how the death penalty
affects the rest of us in society. Our opposition to the death
penalty is rooted in our direct experience of loss and our
refusal to respond to that loss with a quest for more killing.
Executions are not what will help us heal.
Id. See also Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation, supra note

298.
310 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 161, 185 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
3' See, e.g., id. at 169-70, n.4-n.6 (listing various authorities which the

petitioner and the court below gave as evidence that death qualification creates

more conviction-prone juries).
312 Id. at 168-73.
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perceived tactical advantage gives prosecutors a reason to seek the
death penalty that is entirely unrelated to the case. Ironically, a
perceived tactical advantage could lead to use of the death penalty
in weaker cases. If a prosecutor has a rock solid case in which she
is very confident, she will only seek the death penalty if she feels it
is absolutely warranted. If the case is weaker, the prosecution may
take advantage of every opportunity possible to improve results.
Ending the death-qualification process would not
significantly erode prosecutors' ability to use the death penalty to
gain tactical advantage in pleas or confessions. It is already
considered unconstitutional to use the threat of death to get a guilty
plea in a way that precludes the defendants' rights to a jury trial.31
Furthermore, prosecutors would still be able to seek the death
penalty. The defendant will not know what the jury will be like;
through chance the jury may still be fully willing to pass a death
sentence. A truly worried defendant who does not have a strong
case will still do well to plead guilty and cooperate before the jury
is even drawn.
The above factors demonstrate that no one really has the
right to have the death penalty applied. In this situation, it is only
the tyranny of the majority which keeps the death penalty in place.
Death-qualified juries also show something of the tyranny of
tradition; the laws struggle to keep in place that which has always
been done, at the cost of the rights of minority opinion and the
individual. There are also serious costs to the State of complexity
and inconvenience in law to be considered. Tradition would have
us sacrifice rights for convenience sake (it is more convenient to
have one jury than to have two), 314 while ignoring the option that is
313
314

See Furman, 408 U.S. at 355-56.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (explaining "the practical

impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly 'representative'
petit jury . . . ."); id. at 175-76 (explaining that the state has a "legitimate
interest" in having the guilt and penalty phases decided by a single jury);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 430 (1985) (arguing that a judge should not
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most convenient (abolition of the death penalty) because it is not
traditional. This is not to say that convenience to the courts is not a
meaningful argument, but it is pointless to argue about
convenience if all the options are not considered. Abolition could
uphold convenience, human rights and jurors' rights
simultaneously. Having a single jury for guilt and sentencing does
not do this. Whether or not the founders intended tradition to
override evolving standards of decency is immaterial. They clearly
intended to avoid tyranny, and this desire precludes their ability to
based on the past is
be tyrants from beyond the grave. A "faction"
3 15
just as destructive as a newly-created one.
Upholding the death-qualification process because of
tradition and the intentions of the Founding Fathers316 is somewhat
incompatible with the basic idea of the fair cross section
requirement seen in Taylor v. Louisiana.3 17 It is clear that women
or African Americans were not intended to serve on juries at the
time that the Sixth Amendment was written, but ideas have
changed as societal views have changed. 318 "Women are
sufficiently numerous and distinct from men that if they are
systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's
fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied. 3 19 It is in fact
the difference in 'attitudes' that requires the inclusion of groups
like women and African-Americans under Sixth Amendment fair
cross section analysis. 320 If women would hold in exactly the same
way as men, then any given defendant would not care if women
were left out of the jury. Diverse groups lend "a flavor, a distinct
quality" to jury debate. 21 This 'distinct quality' is the very reason
that abolitionist jurors are excluded. At the same time it is an
essential reason that they should not be excluded.
have to write out reasons for exclusion of specific jurors because "[a] trial
judge's job is difficult enough without senseless make-work.").
315 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
316 See, e.g., Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, supra note 263.
317 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535-36 (1975).
3 18

3 19

id.

Id. at 531.
531-32 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)).
532, (citing Ballard,329 U.S. 192-93).

320Id. at
321 Id. at
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X. COMPLICITY

When a democratic society takes an action, all of its
citizens bear some responsibility for that action. "A death penalty
democratically administered implicates us all as agents of state
killing." 322 This is simple democratic common sense. Society does
not want to apply special guilt to judges, lawyers, lawmakers or
jurors because they are doing a job that we told them to do, and
need them to do. The fact that they are government officials 323 or
"following orders" does not excuse these actors from guilt if a
human rights violation takes place. 324 On the other hand, to put
special guilt on these persons would deter them from doing their
important jobs. If there is any guilt, it must be distributed evenly
throughout the State, in the same way that power is supposed to be
distributed evenly in a democracy. A comparison can be made to
executive action during a war, or intervention in an international
human rights violation. In those instances we want the executive to
have power to act expediently, but with that power there should be
a heightened level of responsibility. 325 The death penalty, on the
other hand, is a long, drawn out situation in which no individual

322

SARAT, supra note 236, at 17.

323

See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art.

7(2), May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, at 1-2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) available at, http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoce/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004) ("The official position of any accused
person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment.").
324 Id. at art. 7(3) ("The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of
a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal
determines that justice so requires.").
325 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). It is useful also
to
consider the "humanitarian" actions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Iraq.
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has a heightened level of power 32 6 and so the responsibility is also
shared.
For the death penalty to exist in a democratic society, the
citizens of that society must be complicit with it. Other nations
have recognized participation in the death penalty as complicity in
a human rights violation. 327 The process of death qualification is
especially pernicious as regarding this complicity because it
'forces' citizens to take part in the death penalty process without a
meaningful opportunity to object. Those that object to the death
penalty are precluded from service when service may be the only
meaningful forum for their objections.
Proponents of the death penalty argue that the death penalty
gives certain benefits to society, but these benefits are bought at
the cost of human life. Anyone who silently accepts these benefits
is therefore guilty of some degree of complicity with the death
penalty. It can be argued that the death penalty exists because it
allows society to "demonize" and dehumanize murderers, and thus
ignore the societal conditions that often lead to murder. 328 Much
pro-death rhetoric focuses on the rights of victims, because we all
fear becoming a victim. But the death penalty siinultaneously
makes us all both murderers and potential victims. The majority
populations are less likely to be death penalty victims than murder
victims; racial inequity repays the demonized supposed criminal
326

Although some individuals have heightened power to grant clemency, this is

a power exercised to stop an execution; it is essentially an exception to the laws,
in situations which require expediency, similar to war situations. There are rules
and laws which structure clemency however, and these are created by the
society as a whole. Clemency power is also power to save a life, and failing to
exercise clemency power is arguably different than affirmatively exercising
power to kill.
327 See, e.g., Dina Maslow, Extradition from Israel: The Samuel
Sheinbein
Case, 7 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387, 407 ("Under no hypothesis and for
no type of crime is complicity by the Italian state allowed in the seeking or
carrying out of the death penalty." (quoting Italy Rules Against Return of
Slaying Suspect to the US.; Court Says Extradition Treaty Doesn't Guarantee
Death Penalty Protection,ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 28, 1996, at 56A).
328 SARAT, supra note 236 at 18, 24-25 ("Capital punishment also
has been
crucial in the processes of demonizing young, black males and using them in the
pantheon of public enemies to replace the Soviet 'evil empire.' ").
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elements for their perceived harm to society
by making them the
329
murderer.
the
majority
the
and
victims,
As members of a democratic society, who bear
responsibility for the laws we make and uphold, we should
constantly be aware of the benefits that the laws give to us, as well
as the costs that the laws place upon us. When looking at the death
penalty, it is important to see not only what "it does.., for us," but
"what it does to us." 330 The benefits are especially weak when it
comes to death qualification. In the first place, death qualification
gives benefits only insofar as the death penalty itself gives
benefits. This means that death qualification is subject to all the
same arguments that are made against the death penalty, including
arbitrariness, international rejection, and racial and economic
unfairness. The benefits of death qualification are also weaker than
the benefits of the death penalty because it is not clear that ending
the juror exclusion would actually end the death penalty. Some
jurisdictions will always find it easier to convene a pro-death jury,
and these are likely to be the most killing jurisdictions anyway.
Also, death qualification is weaker than the death penalty because
it makes a further violation of rights, and violates the rights of
more people.
Determining the wrongness of the death penalty would
depend on an acceptance of the rule of international law. If the
government and the majority of the people accept an action as
allowable, then the nation itself accepts this action. The actions of
a nation can best be seen as wrong through comparison to other
nations, because nations are each other's peers. A nation cannot
find itself guilty of a crime due to the same reasoning that bars an
individual from being judge in her own case. The problem, as seen
above, is that the United States is extremely resistant to accepting
international law. One important example using the lens of
international law to focus on the death penalty comes from the
329 Id.
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South African Makwanyane case. 33 1 This case stands in sharp
contrast to the typical attitude seen in the United States. The
Makwanyane opinion refers to and depends on the decisions of
other nations. 332 Ironically, if not unexpectedly, the entire United
States federal court system has referred to Makwanyane only three
times and then only briefly:
in a footnote to a dissent; 333 in a
Ninth Circuit case which, in part, upheld the validity of hanging as
a method of execution;334 and in one district court opinion.
Whether the death penalty is actually a crime or wrong that
society is complicit in remains largely to be determined, both
through international law, and the United States' interaction with
it. There is, however, another element of complicity to be dealt
with: Do citizens have a culpable mental state in regards to the
death penalty? The most common defense of the death penalty
currently is that it is not a wrongful act. If somehow the death
penalty were determined to the satisfaction of the majority to be a
human rights violation, the next likely defense would be to claim
ignorance. The issue of the mental state required for complicity
stands aside from the issue of the wrongfulness of the death
penalty. Can citizens claim ignorance about the wrongness of the
death penalty? It is in part the process of death qualification that
insures that they cannot. The abolitionist jurors' rejection from
service demonstrates a certain consciousness that all is not right
with the death penalty. Justice Marshall wrote in Furman, "[a]t
times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence
society's abhorrence of the act ...[bJut the Eighth Amendment is
our insulation from our baser selves."' 36 Death abolitionists are the
advance guard of "the conscience of the community." 337 Like the
Eighth Amendment, they are attempting to protect society from its
own destructive desire for vengeance. "Assuming knowledge of all
331

See supra notes 140-148, and accompanying text.

332

Id.

333 See Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918, 919 n.3 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
334 See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996).
335 See Pruett v. Norris, 959 F. Supp. 1066, 1091 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
336

Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 344-45 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).

337 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391

U.S. 510, 519 (1968).

2005-2006

Death QualifiedJuries

the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the
average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his
'
conscience and sense of justice."338
The fact that death
qualification excludes jurors only based on their death penalty
beliefs shows that they are in all other ways "average citizens."
They do not have any access to information that any potential juror
could not also access. Rejecting these jurors shows a conscious
blindness to certain types of information. This is information that
is not prejudicial to the finding of guilt in a case, the punishment of
the criminal, or the protection of society from violence. As a
civilized society we cannot simultaneously decide to ignore
information, and claim our ignorance as a defense. 339 We cannot
claim innocence by refusing to know what may easily be known.
Ignoring the abolitionist message only makes the complicity of the
rmajority worse.
If we look back to the statements of Justice Blackmun,34 °
expressing his strong personal opposition to the death penalty,
while simultaneously voting to uphold it, we can see that this is a
terrible and sad position for any person to be in; to feel that the
death penalty is wrong, and should be abolished, but to be
powerless to act against it. How much worse is this dilemma for a
jury member than for a judge? If a person can't apply laws she
doesn't like, she probably should not become a judge, but where
does that leave a juror? Jury service is an essential right, as well as
an essential duty of citizenship. If a person doesn't like the law,
should she not be a citizen? The death penalty also is essentially
different from other punishments. This is not simply a law that one
disagrees with; rather, it is a law that is morally abhorrent to those
who oppose it. It is also substantially reasonable to be opposed to
the death penalty. Citizens should not be coerced to apply it, nor
338
339

Furman,408 U.S., at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 ("Willful

blindness is knowledge.... ")
See supra notes 2-3, and accompanying text.
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forced to walk away from it. Rather, they should be allowed to
participate in the debate in what is the only meaningful forum
available to them. Although the Court has said that this is an issue
that should be left up to the majority, and discussed only through
legislative means, the death penalty does not grab sufficient
elections may
attention to be an important election issue, and many
34
offer no "pro-life" choices from the major parties.
In international law, a person is not excused from a human
rights crime on the basis that they were acting on behalf of the
government, nor are they excused because they were following
' 343
orders. 342 A juror may "temporarily set aside their beliefs
because they were told to do so by a court or by this country's
laws. However, if the death penalty truly is a human rights
violation, as so many around the world have said it is, jurors may
not be able set aside their guilt, even if it is only a personal feeling
of guilt, for this violation. It could be argued that death
qualification is tailor-made for this situation; jurors have the
opportunity to walk away from the case, but this is where other
problems come into play. In the first place, persons with strong
beliefs in the value of human life are unlikely to have their feeling
of complicity assuaged because they turned their backs. They
rather are likely to feel as if they had an opportunity to act
positively, and they gave up that opportunity by vocalizing their
beliefs. This encourages jurors to say they could consider the death
penalty when in fact they could not.344 This 'lie' could be near
341

See supra note 218. See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 361 n.145 (Marshall, J.,

concurring) ("So few people have been executed in the past decade that capital
punishment is a subject only rarely brought to the attention of the average
American.").
342 See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
343 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
344 One problem with opinion polls relating to the death penalty is that a polled
individual can easily say she believes in the death penalty, but she may find it
more difficult when facing an actual defendant. See e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at
361 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[W]hether or not a punishment is cruel and
unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention 'shocks the conscience.., of
the people' ... but on whether people who were fully informed... would find

the penalty shocking.")
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impossible to filter out if jurors believe (or convince themselves)
that they can apply the death penalty. All a juror need do is
imagine the worst possible sort of criminal, the kind of criminal
that will be very unlikely to be in their courtroom, someone guilty
of or responsible for the killing of hundreds or thousands of
people, for example. All but the staunchest life advocates could
probably convince themselves of some situation in which they
could vote for the death penalty if the crime was horrible enough,
and the evidence was strong enough. Once they have actually
reached the point of sentencing, however, the doubts creep back in,
and they may in fact be unable to apply the death penalty.
Of course, the courts should not pander to potential liars; it
does not make sense to run a legal system based on what some
people may ingenuously do. The problem with death qualification
is that it actually encourages lying. It creates a system where a
moral person has a choice between lying to the court (and herself)
or allowing a human being to die through inaction. For anyone
with a strong belief in the value of human life, the choice to lie in
an effort to save a life would be simply and easily made.
XI. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

Jurors stand apart from other creators, enforcers, and
interpreters of the law. Some judges are elected and others are
appointed by elected officials based on their views on certain
issues, meaning that the jury is the only safe haven for randomly
selected opinions. This randomness is of central importance to the
jury process.34 5 The Supreme Court affirms this when it states that
a fair cross section cannot be insured in petit juries. 346 Death
qualification tampers with this important randomness.
What is an acceptable substitute for the death-qualified
345 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1975); Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968).
346 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173-74.
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jury? One option is that the states can impanel two separate juries,
one for the guilt phase and one for the trial. However there are
some serious problems with this option. It entails enough cost and
complexity that the Court has said the state has a significant
interest in maintaining only one jury. 347 On the other hand, as
stated earlier, it makes little sense for a state to argue that it must
have a unified jury because of cost and convenience when it is
arguably much cheaper and more convenient to dispense with the
348
death penalty and its lengthy appeals process altogether.
Another reason that two separate juries should not be used is that it
leads the states back into the problem of nullification. An
abolitionist on the guilt phase jury may vote to acquit or convict of
a lesser offense rather than send the defendant to face a deathqualified jury in the sentencing phase.
A sentence passed by the judge also runs into the problem
of nullification, although if the judge has discretion, the juror can
simply find the facts, and feel less of a sense of complicity,
knowing that the final decision was left to the judge. There are
limits, however, on the amount of discretion that a judge can
exercise. A sentence by the judge must stay clear of the appearance
of a mandatory sentence, which has been disallowed. 349 A judge
that were not found by
also may not determine any additional 35facts
0
sentence.
a
impose
to
the jury in order
The more acceptable solution is for states to carry on (if
they must carry on with the death penalty) with unified, non-deathqualified juries. This will certainly lead to some situations when
the death penalty cannot be applied. The state must face this "luck
of the draw" 35' issue, and it in fact seems unfair to argue that the
341

Id. at 175-76 ("'Death qualification' . . . is carefully designed to serve the

State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly
and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of a capital trial.").
348 See supra note
264.
349 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
350 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002).
31' Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (stating that the defendant cannot challenge the
jury in his case because he could have ended up with exactly the same jury

through "luck of the draw.").

2005-2006

Death QualifiedJuries

defendant must face luck of the draw while prosecutors must not.
The prosecution must simply accept that as long as significant
numbers of people are opposed to death sentences, there will be
some cases when they cannot get the death penalty.
A common reaction to a proposal to end death qualification
is to say that the end of the death qualification process would mean
the end of the death penalty altogether, but this is not necessarily
true. There will always be some communities where it will be
easier to empanel a pro-death jury. Prosecutors could still rely on
their peremptory challenges to exclude those whom they thought
would not give the result they want. If the end of death
qualification did effectively end the death penalty, it would only be
in an indirect way. For example, the end of death qualification
could mean that the death penalty would be applied less often, thus
making its application more "wanton" and "freakish" in cases
where it was used.3 52 This decreased use brings up the Eighth
Amendment issue of cruel and unusual punishment. 35 3 By this
rationale, the less the death penalty is applied, the more it becomes
unfair for those to whom it is applied.
It has been argued that abolition of the death penalty should be left
up to the state and federal legislatures. 355 Abolition will arguably
be much better secured if it comes in the form of popularlymandated legislation. Legislatures embody the demands and
beliefs of the majority, and laws are not open to the same criticism
as "activist courts." 356 On the other hand, the process of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
352

wantonly and so freakishly imposed.").
353 d.
354 id.

See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Furman, supra note 13.
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union 2004, available at
http://www.white house.gov/stateoftheunion/2004/index.html (Jan. 20, 2004)
351

356

(criticizing "activist judges" for upholding same sex unions and "redefine[ing]
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empanelling jurors would seem to be particularly within the realm
of the courts' powers. 357 The Supreme Court stands as the ultimate
head of legal interpretation, and although many court rules are
based on legislation, legislatures cannot be allowed to interfere
with substantial common law or constitutional rights. In Atkins, the
Court overruled the death penalty for mentally retarded persons
based on recognition of the evolution of the community
conscience. 358 In Ring, the court stated, "[alithough the doctrine of
stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.., we
have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of
doing so has been established., 359 Although courts may not be able
they need not actively or passively
to abolish the death penalty,
360
make it easier to apply.
marriage by court order. .. ."); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972)
(ending the death penalty in California through judicial decision); In re Lance
W., 197 Cal. Rptr. 331, 336 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that Anderson
was overruled by an amendment to the State Constitution).
117 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989) (upholding
Congressional grants of rulemaking powers to the federal courts).
358 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
359 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
360 In dissenting in a case which upheld the military detention of Japanese
citizens during WWII, Justice Jackson stated:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will
sustain [a military order] is a far more subtle blow to liberty
than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order,
however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding
commander may revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all
time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.
The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle
more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new
purposes.
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X11. CONCLUSION

If a belief interferes with the application of the law by
jurors, does it in fact go against the public good? The answer to
this question is that the excluded jurors do not stand opposed to the
public good. A prosecutor and a defendant arguably have directly
opposed interests in mind; the prosecutor is acting in the interest of
the state or the public, while the defendant acts in his own interest.
The excluded juror on the other hand can lay claim to a state or
public interest that is just as valid as the prosecutor's. The
excludable juror can claim that from their point of view it simply is
not good for the public or the State for the death penalty to be
applied. Abolitionist jurors are not fighting against the State; they
are arguably fighting for it.
Abolitionists can argue that the death penalty is "no longer
consistent with our own self respect." 361 Death qualification simply
excludes the losing side in an unsettled debate about what is in fact
best for society. If the belief were in some way more harmful to
society, like a belief that there should be no punishment of
criminals, or a belief in complete anarchy, it would be easy to
argue that these jurors should be excluded for putting their own
beliefs ahead of what the law states. In the case of the death
penalty, however, a strong case can be made that the abolitionist
has the best interest of the State and the legal system in mind. A
clearly guilty murderer is not a very sympathetic character, and a
juror opposed to death can easily be argued to be concerned with
the problems of the State rather than the criminal. Many who are
opposed to the death penalty are concerned with innocents being
put to death, or unfair application by race or class. These are the
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
361 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 315 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)
(quoting 268 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 703 (1965) (Lord Chancellor Gardiner)).
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State's problems, and they serve to erode "public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system." 362 A State is more harmed
if it wrongly or unfairly applies the death penalty than if it does not
apply the death penalty at all.363
In the face of fairness, justice, and economic concerns,
supporters of the death penalty in the United States often fall back
on religious arguments to argue that the death penalty should be
upheld.364 It is absolutely essential that the rule of law trump any
specific religion or specific interpretation of a religion. Neither the
majority, nor the ghosts of the past should be allowed to interfere
with the rights of individuals. Although the United States may
have been founded on many Christian ideas, in no way is it
constitutional to force the majority to continue to be Christians. If
Christianity were to disappear from the country, it would be absurd
to require punishments to still be meted out based on Christian
principles. There are two fatal flaws in any religious arguments
that can be made in support of the death penalty. The first is that
Christianity, like any religion, is subject to varying interpretations.
Death penalty support could be seen as a misinterpretation of
Christianity, 36 and at its best is a divergent interpretation. The
362

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana,

419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975)).
363

See Furman, 408 U.S. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("In striking down

capital punishment, this Court does not malign our system of government. On
the contrary, it pays homage to it.").
364

See, e.g., Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, supra note 263:

The death penalty is undoubtedly wrong unless one accords to
the state a scope of moral action that goes beyond what is
permitted to the individual. In my view, the major impetus
behind modem aversion to the death penalty is the equation of
private morality with governmental morality. This is a
predictable (though I believe erroneous and regrettable)
reaction to modem, democratic self-government.
Id.
Justice Scalia also cites Romans 13:1-5, for the proposition that the State has
the moral power to apply the death penalty. For a general discussion of religion
in relation to death qualification, see Brian Galle, Free Exercise Rights of
CapitalJurors, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 569 (2001).

Although the Bible does contain various calls for the death penalty, the best
reference to my mind comes directly from the namesake of the religion. When
365
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second and moresubstantial problem with religious arguments that
support the death penalty is that it makes an assumption that the
'rule of law' can be based on any one specific religion. Although
many of the founding fathers were Christians, they also built into
the Constitution important protections against the interference of
religion with law. 36V It flies in the face of religious freedom to say
that one religion's idea of the death penalty should be upheld, as
opposed to other interpretations or other religions that argue for
abolition. Under the death qualification system, those whose
religion and morals are opposed to the death penalty are excluded
from jury service based on their religion and morals.
It is clear that potential jurors are reasonable if they are
opposed to the death penalty. A reasonable juror is a good juror.
The process of death qualification, in removing reasonable jurors
for cause, violates the rights of allpersons, even those who support
the death penalty. Sometimes innocent people are tried for death
penalty crimes, and these people have the right not to the best
individual jury possible, but to the best possible process of
drawing a jury. Death qualification interferes with this right.
Furthermore, death qualification removes jurors from death penalty
cases based on issues that have nothing to do with the facts of the
cases. In allowing this, we run the risk that the same policy could
be extended to other cases, thus making all jury formation
the Sixth
processes less fair. This would directly counter
367
jury.'
impartial
"an
by
trial
Amendment guarantee of
In conclusion, it is clear that the rule of law, both
internationally, and internally, cannot be said to clearly support the
continuation of the death penalty. All citizens are complicit with
Jesus was faced with a crowd that wanted to execute a woman he said: "He that
is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." John 8:7. To
paraphrase, let he who is without sin cast the first vote for death in a jury, or the
write the first judicial opinion upholding death.
366 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting
an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
367 U.S.

CONST.

amend. VI.
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the death penalty, and the majority should not force the minority to
bear this complicity. Not only is the death penalty applied unfairly
by race and class, but the very same groups that bear the greatest
burden from execution are also often the most likely to be
excluded by death qualification. The supporters of the death
penalty impose economic, social, developmental and moral harm
on the rest of the country in exchange for falsely perceived moral
gains.

